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Choosing War
A Constitutional and Ethical Evaluation of the U.S. Response to
9/11 in OIF and OEF
Garen Marshall

ABSTRACT
Terrorism, which is often politically motivated, is an intentional act or threat of
violence against noncombatants that is performed with the aim of influencing the
actions of a third group. Governments may respond to such acts through the
paradigm of war (which emphasizes killing or capturing enemy combatants) or the
paradigm of crime (which emphasizes arresting and prosecuting perpetrators). In
framing the nation’s geopolitical response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Bush administration primarily applied the war model (through Operations Iraqi and
Enduring Freedom: OIF and OEF) but also incorporated some elements of the crime
paradigm. In order to evaluate the administration’s use of these paradigms in the
international response to 9/11, the war powers of the President are first analyzed
through the lens of the U.S. Constitution and other relevant legal documents
(including the Insurrection and Posse Comitatus Acts). The analysis of this thesis first
concludes that by responding to 9/11 through OEF and OIF, the Bush administration
acted within the parameters of the Constitution. As an additional method of
evaluation, OEF and OIF are then analyzed according to principles of Just War Theory
(jus ad bellum and jus in bello). Through this analysis, the thesis concludes that
although OEF has been better than most previous wars, neither OIF nor OEF have
been completely acceptable.
THESIS STATEMENT
The U.S. response to 9/11 in OIF and OEF has been constitutionally sound but not completely
ethical according to a rights-based, just war analysis.
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Introduction
At 8:46 a.m. on Tuesday September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed
into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. As the U.S. came
under the largest attack since Pearl Harbor, I sat across the Upper New York Bay in my
eleventh-grade American History class trying to make sense of what had occurred. We were
locked in the classroom for several hours as the school’s administrators tried to figure out
how to handle the situation. By the time we were released I had already decided that I would
join the military no matter where it would take me.
In March 2003, two days after my eighteenth birthday, I enlisted in the U.S. Navy and
planned to become an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. After learning how to
disarm every type of explosive device in existence, I quickly began deploying to the Middle
East in support of the Bush administration’s War on Terror.
My primary responsibility during my deployments to the Middle East was to disarm
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left by insurgents to kill civilians and coalition troops.
An additional responsibility in my role as an EOD technician was to conduct post-blast
analysis on sites of significant insurgent-performed attacks that had involved explosives. In
those cases I was to use my expertise in explosives to analyze what had happened at the
scene, including making conjectures about who had performed the attack and by what means.
On April 15, 2008 I was tasked with performing a post-blast analysis in Baquba, Iraq.
When I arrived on the scene it turned out that a vehicle-borne IED had been driven into the
center of a crowded marketplace filled with civilian men, women, and children. In my
investigation, I found that the attacker had been an Iraqi police officer who filled the trunk of
3

his police cruiser with explosives in order to kill as many civilians as possible, along with a
couple of Iraqi soldiers. Among the dead were a woman, her six-year-old daughter, and her
five-year-old son. A bus that had flipped over during the explosion (one of eight vehicles
destroyed) landed on the mother and her daughter, most likely killing them instantly. The
boy, on the other hand, was not completely crushed so he lived long enough to spend his last
few minutes looking at his dead mother and sister. A few meters away, in the car directly
behind the VBIED, the decapitated driver still held what remained of his arms aloft at the
wheel.
When I returned to base I was greatly disturbed. Certainly, part of being deployed to
a war zone is learning to detach your emotions from what is going on around you. But when
I thought about the children and all the people whose lives had been so brutally ended that
day, I was at a loss for how a person could do such horrible things to innocent people. I
eventually began to question whether our presence in Iraq was even doing any good. I had
heard, at times, from several Iraqis, that they were better off after the American invasion.
Yet I also wondered how many of the Iraqis (and Americans) who died in the war could have
otherwise lived decent lives. It seemed natural that I came to question the morality of the
war in Iraq. It is that questioning of the morality of war which was the impetus for this
paper.
My original reason for joining the military was 9/11. The enormity of the attacks
made it seem clear from that day, that we would respond militarily. At the time, everything
seemed black and white. But in retrospect, there were a lot of questions that should have
been answered before we went to war: “Was 9/11 a crime or an act of war?” “Was the Bush
administration acting within their constitutional powers in deciding to go to war?” And
4

finally, “Were the wars, as a response to 9/11, ethically justified?” It is these questions that I
will attempt to answer here.
In Section I of this paper, I will discuss what terrorism is. Although identifying
instances of terrorism may at first appear straightforward, competing definitions from key
stakeholders complicate this process significantly.

In an effort to establish a shared

definition for the remainder of the thesis I consider who it is that can perform acts of
terrorism, who the intended targets are, and what the goals of terrorism must be. In Section
II, I will go on to describe the differences in methods for responding to acts of terrorism. I
will set up what will be described as the war and crime paradigms (the war paradigm having
an emphasis on killing or capturing enemy combatants, and the crime paradigm having an
emphasis on arresting and prosecuting perpetrators).
In Section III I begin to analyze the Bush administration’s choice to go to war in
response to 9/11. I begin this investigation by evaluating what powers the Constitution, the
Insurrection and Posse Comitatus Acts, and presidential signing statements give the President
in choosing how to respond to acts of terrorism. Additionally, I review recent and past case
law to explain what powers the President has in choosing to prosecute enemy combatants
once they are captured.
Finally, in Section IV, I will put forward a moral evaluation of the decision to go to
war in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building on the groundwork of just war theorists, such as
Michael Walzer, I further develop a moral theory intended to ensure that actions in war
recognize the individual rights of human beings. Through the lens of this rights-based, just
war theory analysis, I reveal the ethical limitations of our military endeavors in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
5

I

Defining Terrorism
The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as:
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious, or ideological. 1
In contrast, the U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as:
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 2
Surprisingly, it seems that the definitions provided by these two organizations are vastly
different. The State Department definition is much more specific in limiting who terrorist
attacks are perpetrated against (noncombatants) as well as who they are perpetrated by. The
Department of Defense, on the other hand, references the particular groups (governments and
societies) that terrorism is intended to influence. This divergence in the defining of terrorism
amongst our governmental organizations is just one of many examples. Of course, if this
were only an issue of semantics it would not be a major problem, but unfortunately, the
ability of national and international organizations to successfully combat terrorism relies, in
part, on a common understanding of what is and what is not an act of terrorism.
One of the major difficulties in defining terrorism is that the term’s usage has
changed with time. The term “terrorism” was originated during the latter part of the French

1

United States. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Instruction Number 2000.18.
2002. www.dtic.mil. Department of Defense. Web. 25 Oct. 2010.
2
"Patterns of Global Terrorism." U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, 30 Apr. 2001. Web. 25 Oct. 2010.
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Revolution. The régime de la terreur described the governmental use of mass executions to
silence opposition to the newly formed revolutionary government.

For a short time la

terreur enjoyed a reasonably positive connotation, since it was seen as needed to maintain
order. Before long, however, the reach of la terreur grew too large and the revolutionary
leader who had argued for the virtue of governmental terrorism (Maximilien Robespierre)
was executed, transforming “terrorism” into the pejorative term it is considered to be today. 3
Although terrorism was used at times to describe the tactics of non-governmental
revolutionary and anarchistic groups in the 19th century, the early to mid 20th century led to a
shift back to terrorism as a description of state-based actions (those of Italy, Germany, and
Russia). It wasn’t until after WWII that terrorism came to be a description of decidedly nonstate based actions. Whether as a result of the fine-tuned rhetoric of nations in the post-war
world or due to the change in tactics of governmental and non-governmental groups, it seems
that terrorism, as a description of non-state based actions has remained in common use
through to today.
In defining terrorism, then, the first consideration should be who it is that can perform
an act of terrorism. In his book, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, Igor Primoratz claims
that an act of terrorism must have “the aim of intimidating some other people [than those
attacked] into a course of action they would otherwise not take” 4 (this being a major point of
distinction between terrorism and murder). Certainly it seems that this sort of action is not
dependant on the identity of the person or group performing it. In fact, some of the most
historically significant acts of violence have taken exactly this form, for example, the
3

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. Print. Page 4.
Primoratz, Igor. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2004. Print. Page 6.
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American atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the British “area bombings”
of German cities in WWII. 5 In both of these instances the primary goal of the attackers was
not to slaughter thousands of civilians but to break the will of the opposing military forces
and governments, thereby pressuring those governments to surrender. Yet, since much of
today’s discourse on the topic of terrorism seems to restrict that label to actions performed
by non-state entities (as is the case in the U.S. Department of Defense definition), 6 further
specification on the criteria required for a terrorist attack is needed.
In the U.S. State Department’s definition of terrorism (referenced above), the identity
of the victim is offered as a defining feature. According to the State Department, a terrorist
attack is “perpetrated against noncombatant targets.”

In further explanation, the State

Department defines “noncombatants” as “civilians (or) military personnel who at the time of
the incident are unarmed or not on duty.” 7 The idea that there is a difference between attacks
on combatant and non-combatant targets is a moral distinction. The common view of
“terrorism” as a pejorative term combined with the idea that attacks on combatants are the
only type that can be legitimate 8 is likely the reason that terrorism has been restricted to
attacks on noncombatants.

5

Accordingly, when Iraqi insurgents attack a combatant U.S.

Primoratz 141.
(When referring to acts of this nature performed by states, many laymen as well as the
media will not refer to such acts simply as terrorism but will qualify the acts as state
terrorism or will not call them terrorism at all). For examples of the use of the term “state
terrorism,” see "US Has Endorsed Indian State Terrorism in Occupied Kashmir." Pakistan
Patriot. 10 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2010. ; "State Terrorism Stays on Having Thrown out
Tamil Terrorism It Spawned." Sri Lanka Guardian. 2 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2010.
7
"Patterns of Global Terrorism." U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, 30 Apr. 2001. Web. 25 Oct. 2010.
8
Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 4 Feb.
2000. Web. 01 Oct. 2010.
8
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military convoy in Iraq it is an act of war, but when they attack civilians in a crowded
marketplace, it may be (although not necessarily) an act of terrorism.
In response to the U.S. Department of State’s definition of “noncombatants” as
“civilians (or) military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty”
it must be pointed out that their classification of some military personnel as noncombatants is
far too over inclusive. Although this will be discussed in much further detail in Section IV,
there is a significant moral distinction between civilians and all military personnel in the
rights that they enjoy.

By becoming a combatant one sacrifices some rights that a civilian

does not and so whether military personnel are actively participating in hostilities is
inconsequential to whether they are in the same class as civilians. As pointed out by Rutgers
University Professor of Philosophy, Jeff McMahan, “It is therefore because combatants pose
a threat to others that they are legitimate targets of attack; and it is because noncombatants
threaten no one that they are not legitimate targets.” 9 This being said, the U.S. Department
of State’s restriction on acts of terrorism to those perpetrated against noncombatants is
acceptable, but those noncombatants are exclusively civilian. Moreover, this does not imply
that it is never wrong to kill a combatant; just that killing a combatant is not constitutive of
an act of terrorism.
In discussing the distinctions between the killing of combatants and noncombatants it
must, furthermore, be pointed out that some people reject the distinction completely. On one
side of the argument, there are those who believe that attacks on combatants are just as

9

McMahan, Jeff. "An Ethical Perspective on Child Soldiers." Child Soldiers in the Age of
Fractured States. By Simon Reich and Scott Gates. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh,
2009. 29. Print.
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morally impermissible as attacks on noncombatants. 10 Yet, there is a strong argument to be
made for the moral rights of people to defend themselves, their property, and those around
them against attacks by others. In fact, in many cases it seems as though there is a moral
duty to do so. If we are to say that it cannot be morally acceptable to attack combatants, we
are left with a level of pacifism that is counter to the commonly accepted views of Just War
Theory (which will be discussed in further detail in Section IV). 11 Whether from a Kantian,
Utilitarian, or Just War perspective, there seem to be significant justifications for the view
that it is at least sometimes permissible to attack combatants.
On the other side of the debate, there are those who claim that it is not only morally
acceptable to attack combatants but that in some circumstances it is permissible to attack
those who support them (e.g., by being members of a democracy). Although many earlier
terrorist groups believed that civilians should be free from attack, 12 with time this view was
abandoned; most noticeably in the late 20th century. Noah Feldman outlined the growing
inclusiveness of acceptable targets of violence (from the view of radical-Muslim terrorists) in
a speech entitled, “Past & Future in the Middle East: 7 Years Since 9/11”: the attack on the
U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was justified because those present (although not involved in
active combat) were “military occupiers.”

In Arab-Israeli conflicts, women became

acceptable targets since they were serving in the military. Eventually, attacks on American
civilians were accepted, since democracy means that everyone is involved (although the

10

Fiala, Andrew. "Pacifism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
2010. Web. 24 Oct. 2010.
11
Orend
12
For example, the Russian group Narodnaya Volya claimed that, “‘not one drop of
superfluous blood’ should be shed in pursuit of aims, however noble or utilitarian they might
be.” See Hoffman 6.
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deaths of children pose a particular problem for this assertion). 13 It seems, thought, that this
growing inclusiveness of morally acceptable targets is a problem for the distinction between
the rights of combatants and noncombatants.
Because they do not directly participate in hostilities, civilians are illegitimate objects
of attack. As humans we, in some sense, enjoy a right to life. This right to life should be
understood not only as Thomas Hobbes understood it, as being a right to protect one’s own
life, but as implying a corresponding duty on others not to interfere with one’s ability to
continue living. 14 However (as will be discussed in much greater detail in Section IV), by
becoming combatants some people sacrifice their rights to life, which is why they are the
only people considered legitimate targets of attack. Since combatants lack a full right to life,
others also have a diminished duty to not interfere with the combatant’s right to life. This
means that there is a duty not to kill civilians but that there is either a much more limited or
even no duty at all not to kill combatants. For this reason, the argument that it is morally
acceptable to attack noncombatants should be discarded.
So to clarify, thus far the criteria for an act of terrorism are that it be performed with
the aim of influencing the actions of a group other than the one attacked and that the victims
of the attack be noncombatants. These criteria seem to be satisfying in as far as they allow
attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing and the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa to be
considered acts of terrorism. However, we are still left with the issue of who it is that can
perform acts of terrorism. Although it is clear that non-state entities (e.g., Al Qaeda, FARC,
13

Feldman, Noah. “Past & Future in the Middle East: 7 Years Since 9/11.” 92 Street YMCA,
NYC. 11 Sep. 2008.
14
Hobbes, Thomas. "XV Of Other Laws of Nature." Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, &
Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. McMaster University Archive of the
History of Economic Thought. 88-92.
11

etc…) may perform acts of terrorism, the criteria stated thus far leave the door open to the
idea that states can also perform acts of terrorism. Clearly, this requires further investigation
since so much of the common discourse seems to restrict the label of “terrorism” to non-state
actions.
At first glance it may seem that actions that satisfy the aforementioned criteria are
morally worse when performed by non-state actors. However, this view is most likely the
product of life in a country where non-state actors have performed the most notorious
attacks. In reality, it seems that these actions, when performed by states, not only lack moral
superiority (compared to those actions when performed by non-state actors), but that, as
pointed out by Igor Primoratz, they are often morally worse for at least four reasons:
•
•

•
•

State based terrorism is typically performed on a much larger scale.
State based terrorism usually involves secrecy, deception, and
hypocrisy [of course, the same may be said about actions performed
by non-state actors but it, in some sense, seems worse when it is our
own government deceiving us].
State based terrorism violates international human right declarations
or conventions and agreements the states sign on to.
States cannot say they have no alternative, for the most part. 15

Accordingly, many philosophers and political scientists alike have made the argument that
“states as well as non-state groups can engage in terrorism.” 16 Yet, if state and non-state
actors alike may perform acts of terrorism, there must be some explanation for why the term
“terrorism” is so often used as referring exclusively to the actions of non-state actors. I
would attribute this discrepancy to the ability of states to control the dialogue of terrorism.
In The Semantics of Terrorism, Edward Herman claims, “Terrorism is mainly
an instrument of the strong, who have the resources to terrorise, a frequent interest in using
15
16

Primoratz 117.
Held, Virginia. "Terrorism and War." The Journal of Ethics 8.1 (2004): 59-75. Print.
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terror to keep opponents of their rule under control, and the cultural power to define
terrorism to exclude themselves and pin the label on their enemies and targets [italics
added].” 17 Although it is not completely clear that terrorism is primarily carried out by the
“strong” (since it seems most acts of terrorism are very small attacks), Herman’s observation
that those with cultural power label others as terrorists explains the common usage of the
term. As it is clear that state action may constitute terrorism, it is the ability of states to
categorize non-state actors as terrorists that has driven mainstream terminology. Obviously
it is advantageous to have your enemy labeled as a terrorist, while being immune to such a
classification for similar, if not more horrendous actions.
One pervasive, yet unsuccessful method of countering the ability of strong actors to
label others as terrorists, which must be addressed, is making the claim that “one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” For example:
Speaker A: “The 9/11 hijackers were clearly terrorists.”
Speaker B: “Well, that’s not necessarily true. You know, one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
Of course, speaker A’s statement is clearly consistent with the criteria of terrorism discussed
thus far, but how can this make sense if, as speaker B points out, some people may have seen
the hijackers as “freedom fighters?”

It seems the issue here is really that speaker B’s

argument is based on a faulty assumption. When speaker B replies in this conversation, the
argument he/she is really making is that “Some people may have seen the hijackers as
freedom fighters. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that the hijackers may be objectively
labeled as terrorists.” It seems though that in making this claim, speaker B is assuming that
17

Herman, Edward Sherry. "The Semantics of Terrorism." World Dialogue. Center for
World Dialogue, 2000. Web. 08 Nov. 2010.
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someone cannot be both a freedom fighter and a terrorist, which is certainly not true. A
terrorist, by definition is someone who commits acts of terrorism. A freedom fighter is
someone who fights for the goal of freedom. In comparing the two, labeling someone a
terrorist describes the tactics they use, while labeling someone a freedom fighter describes
their ultimate goal. So, when speaker B claims that some people see the 9/11 hijackers as
freedom fighters this is perfectly consistent with the obvious fact that the hijackers were
simultaneously terrorists. As speaker B’s claim will run into the same problem in every
instance, it is insufficient to counter the labeling ability of strong actors (i.e., states). It
seems clear, then, that powerful actors will continue to control the mainstream dialogue of
terrorism. Fortunately, despite the ability of these actors to control the dialogue, it is fairly
clear that there is no reason why some state actions cannot be considered terrorism.
Recognizing that “terrorism” should not be restricted to describing only non-state actions
leaves the growing definition of terrorism as an act of violence against noncombatants (in
accordance with the State Department definition of noncombatant), performed with the aim
of influencing the actions of a third group.
Another issue that must be addressed is that the U.S. Department of Defense includes
threats of violence in their definition. As Sherry Colb points out, “Threats can…sometimes
accomplish more than physical violence can, and when the "accomplishment" is destructive
rather than benign, it might be fair to characterize the threat as "worse" at some level than the
violence.” 18 Yet, the fact that the effects of threats may be just as bad as those of actual
violence is not the reason why the Department of Defense is correct in including some
18

Colb, Sherry. "Threats Versus Physical Violence." Dorf on Law. 04 Feb. 2010. Web. 25
Oct. 2010. <http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/02/threats-versus-physical-violence.html>.
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threats of violence in their definition. At the core of terrorism is the way in which terror
influences the group that is not attacked. If, for example, a group which has been known to
carry out bombings in the past threatened to attack shopping malls throughout the U.S., the
fear they intend to generate in shoppers and the effect they intend this threat to have on the
government are just as constitutive of terrorism as if they had carried out the attacks. Of
course, having not carried out the attacks is a significant mitigating factor, but the threat has
still attained the aim of influencing a third group through terror, which is most certainly the
essence of terrorism. Accordingly, the definition of terrorism must be expanded to include
not only acts of violence but threats of violence as well. This adjustment will leave the
definition of terrorism as an act or threat of violence against noncombatants, performed with
the aim of influencing the actions of a third group.
Another aspect of both the Department of Defense and State Department definitions
of terrorism is that they refer to terrorist acts as being “premeditated” or “calculated.” The
reason for this is most likely to establish that these acts involve a certain level of intent.
Although it may be the case that many attacks are, in fact, thought out to the level that these
agencies have specified, premeditation or calculation (i.e., planning the attack ahead of time
as opposed to it being more spontaneous) cannot be considered necessary to reach the level
of intent involved in terrorism. Although it is certainly necessary that an act of terrorism
involve intent, the idea that an act of terrorism must be premeditated or calculated is too high
a standard. One can clearly imagine an act of violence that someone carries out because the
attacker has built up a sense of anger or frustration and has simply had an opportunity
presented to him or her. For example, someone who is frustrated with poor service provided
by the local bussing company may decide, while riding on the bus, to attack the driver,
15

intentionally causing him to steer the bus off of a cliff and killing all of the passengers.
Although this act could have been performed with absolutely no prior planning or
forethought (for example, the attacker could have become particularly frustrated while riding
on the bus and spontaneously decided it was the appropriate time for such an attack), few, if
any would deny that it is an act of terrorism.
A lower standard of intent which is still sufficient to constitute an act of terrorism is
similar to that called for by the mens rea requirement in most common law systems. 19 In
order for someone to be found guilty of a crime, it is necessary (in most instances) that the
prosecution establish the mental culpability of the defendant. In order for such culpability to
be established, there are two factors that must be satisfied. First, the act must be voluntary.
In other words, the person performing the act must have been able to do otherwise. If this
standard were applied to terrorism, the implication would be that an act of terrorism could
not be caused by factors outside the perpetrator’s control.

For example, if someone

somehow tripped and fell off of a building, thereby killing several bystanders below, the
involuntary nature of his actions would preclude the act from being an act of murder. On a
side note, coercion (e.g., a threat of death unless an action is performed) does not make an
action involuntary. Although coercion may be considered a mitigating factor for committing
an act of terrorism, such an act cannot be considered involuntary. Someone who carries out a
coerced act could do otherwise (than perform the act), he just decides it would be in his or
someone else’s best interests that he completes the act as demanded.

19

Sayre, Francis B. "Mens Rea." Harvard Law Review 45.6 (1932): 974-1026. JSTOR. Web.
24 Oct. 2010.
16

The second factor that is necessary in establishing intent is that the actor be aware or
should have been aware of the likely outcome of his actions.

If someone, for example, is

tricked into detonating an explosive device (say, the trigger mechanism for an explosive
device is actuated by turning on a light switch, and the person in question was asked to turn
that light switch on), he cannot be considered responsible for an act of terrorism, since he
neither knew or should have known what the likely outcome of his actions would be. Of
course, in an instance like this, the only person who can be said to have carried out an act of
terrorism would be whoever set up the explosive device in the first place. Therefore, with
these two factors of intent understood (and after discarding the governmental terminology,
since “premeditated” or “calculated” are each too high a standard), the newest formulation of
the definition of terrorism is an intentional act or threat of violence against noncombatants,
performed with the aim of influencing the actions of a third group.
A final consideration in the defining of terrorism is whether these acts must be, as
Bruce Hoffman puts it, “ineluctably political in aims and motives.” 20 In agreement with
Hoffman, Robert Gilpin uses 9/11 as just one example of how “terrorism in all its many
manifestations is a form of political action carried out to achieve specific political
objectives.” 21 Although it is clear that 9/11 was politically motivated (Osama Bin Laden has
long called for the restoration of the Caliphate as well as the expulsion of Westerners from
Muslim lands), it does seem theoretically possible that an act of terrorism could have a nonpolitical goal. To clarify, politically aimed terrorism would be those acts intended to have an
effect on either governmental or social policy. For example, the attacks on the US embassies
20

Hoffman 40.
Gilpin, Robert. "War Is Too Important to Be Left to Ideological Amateurs." International
Relations 19.1 (2005): 5-18. Print
17
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in Kenya and Tanzania were political because the attackers intended to change US
governmental policy. On the other hand, the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, pervasive
throughout the South during Reconstruction, was political as a result of its aim of changing
social policy. One example of terrorism that may not be political would be an attack on a
local shopkeeper by the mafia in order to intimidate other shopkeepers into paying a monthly
fee. This sort of non-political terrorism has been described as having a “conscious design to
create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or
collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective.” 22 So, while it may be
true that most forms of terrorism are political, it seems theoretically possible that there may
be non-political forms of terrorism as well. This will leave the final version of the definition
of terrorism as an intentional act or threat of violence against noncombatants, which is often
politically motivated, and is performed with the aim of influencing the actions of a third
group.
As it is now relatively clear what is and what is not an act of terrorism, it will be
much easier to examine the ways in which terrorism can be dealt with and to evaluate the
U.S. response to 9/11. In section II, as I discuss the two paradigms through which terrorism
may be addressed I will narrow the scope of my focus to the most salient and problematic
form of terrorism throughout the United States: radical-Islamic terrorism performed by nonstate actors. For simplicity, when referring to “terrorism” throughout the rest of the paper, it
is this specific form of terrorism that I will be discussing.

22

United States. Department of Justice. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals. Disorders and Terrorism. 1976. Print.
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II

Crime vs. War
One of the central questions in any counterterrorism strategy is whether terrorism
should be handled as war or crime. Choosing one paradigm over another will have major
consequences. The acceptable use of force, the protection of rights, and the sort of justice
sought varies greatly with each. With the attacks of September 11th, 2001, serving as the
most effective terrorist attacks in modern history (of those performed by non-state actors),
these two paradigms each offer a distinct and critically important range of options in
responding to and preventing future attacks. What responding to terrorism through either of
these paradigms entails will be the focus of this section.
At least until recent times, the distinction between crimes (which violate domestic
law) and acts of war (which have typically been considered a challenge to the attacked state’s
sovereignty) has been seen as relatively clear. These traditional distinctions have been based
around four criteria that are outlined by Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard
Law School, Noah Feldman, in his essay, “Choices of Law, Choices of War”: identity,
provenance, intent, and scale. 23
The identity criterion is, perhaps, the simplest traditional distinction between war and
crime. This is the idea that states, immune from domestic law, can only carry out acts of
war, not crime, when attacking other states. Conversely, non-state actors lack such immunity
from domestic law, and so their acts of aggression are considered criminal in nature. This
criterion, of course, is dependant on the supposition that the only true law is domestic in
23
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nature, and that there is a global state of anarchy.

Therefore, the existence of global

institutions of law, such as the International Court of Justice, poses a problem for such a
belief.
The provenance criterion refers to the jurisdictional provenance of states.

This

criterion requires that crimes occur only within the areas in which states are considered to
have legal jurisdiction.

This provenance is, however, relatively vast, since it includes

“actions within its [the state’s] borders (even if taken outside the borders); actions against its
nationals, even nationals abroad under some circumstances; and actions taken outside the
state that are directed against the security of the state.” 24 On the other hand, acts of war are
typically considered as being committed from outside the provenance of the attacked state,
even though the attacks themselves may occur within that provenance. Hence, the states
usually refrain from making laws against attacks performed on them by other states. These
acts of war are seen as being beyond the grasp of domestic law, making them distinct from
the crimes of non-state actors performed within the state’s legal jurisdictions.
The third criterion, that of intent, refers to the purpose of the attackers as a point of
distinction between war and crime. In acts of crime, it is claimed, that the perpetrators act
within the legal framework of the state. Their intent is to commit their act (which they are
usually aware is a violation of domestic law) and evade capture, prosecution, and
punishment. In contrast, the intent of an actor in an act of war is not to similarly evade legal
sanctions, but to challenge the system of the attacked state itself.

In other words, the

criminal acts within the legal system, while the warrior acts from without. Of course, war

24
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crimes are troublesome for the intent criterion, but they are just one of several issues faced
by these traditional criteria.
Finally, the scale criterion places war and crime on a continuum of force.

The

difference between war and crime, it is claimed, is that war is noticeably larger. This means
that a particularly small act of aggression is not an act of war, despite the identity of the
attacker. Likewise, a massive attack performed either by a state or some non-state entity is
an act of war. In the past this criterion would most often have led to the same line being
drawn as the identity criterion (i.e., state actions as war and non-state actions as crime).
Today, however, the rise of technology has made it possible for these two criteria to have
different outcomes. 9/11 serves as the perfect example of how massive attacks are no longer
isolated within the domain of state action. This means that although the scale criterion
would label 9/11 as an act of war, the identity criterion would label the attacks as criminal.
Acts like 9/11 are not the only ones that cause problems for the stability of the four
criteria.

As Feldman points out, other difficulties arise when trying to classify acts of

treason, rebellion, civil disobedience, and (as mentioned earlier) war crimes. 25 For example,
cases of civil disobedience, when understood through the identity criterion, are certainly
instances of crime. The intent criterion, however, would possibly label certain acts of civil
disobedience as war, since they may be performed with the intent of challenging the
sovereignty of the state. A particularly large act of civil disobedience may be considered war
under the scale criterion, and yet the provenance criterion would label civil disobedience as
crime. Although there are many actions that may be easily identified as falling into either
the war or crime paradigms, the few borderline cases that exist may pose some serious
25

Feldman.
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problems. Most recently, the blurred distinction between crime and war has become a major
issue in dealing with terrorism. Beginning with 9/11, the US response to terrorism, which
was greatly affected by choosing between these paradigms, has had a major effect on many
countries around the world. That said, it is extremely important to consider the implications
of confronting terrorism from either a crime or war paradigm.

Significance of the Crime/War Distinction: Kill/Capture or Arrest/Prosecute.
One of the most important differences between the paradigms of war and crime is
how choosing one over the other affects the morality of causing harm to certain individuals
(in war those individuals are combatants and in crime they are suspects). In war, the aim in
pursuing a combatant is to deny him the ability to perform an attack (whether he would
actually take part in an attack or just contribute to the ability of the enemy forces to perform
attacks). This being the case, it is usually considered acceptable for soldiers to kill the
targeted individuals on sight. The only instance in which a soldier is prohibited from killing
a targeted individual (assuming the soldier’s orders have not precluded the use of deadly
force) is when that individual is either attempting to surrender and/or is incapacitated. 26 In
the event that the targeted individual does surrender or becomes incapacitated, the soldier’s
responsibility shifts from killing to capturing them. The captured individual will then be
held as a prisoner of war until the conclusion of hostilities, at which point he will be released
(assuming that he has not committed crimes against the law of war, i.e., war crimes).
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When acting within the paradigm of crime, the law enforcer (typically, police) is
responsible for a much more non-violent approach. As opposed to the soldier’s immediate
objective of killing or capturing their target, the law enforcer’s immediate focus is on
apprehension. Force should be used only as a last resort, and even then the force should be
kept to a minimum (hence, the use of nightsticks, pepper spray, and tasers as alternatives to
pistols, rifles, and shotguns). In fact, it seems that the use of force by law enforcers is
acceptable not for its utility in serving the objective of apprehension, but for its necessity in
circumstances where the enforcers or bystanders are facing “an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury.” 27
In addition to the differences as far as the appropriate times for the use of force, the
rules of war and the rules of law enforcement find different levels of “collateral damage” to
be acceptable.

As Baruch College Professor Douglas P. Lackey explains, in war

“noncombatants can be legitimately killed if their killing is an unavoidable side effect of
military operation aimed at some legitimate effect and is proportionate to the importance of
that effect.” 28

This Doctrine of Double Effect is a readily accepted part of Just War

Theory. 29 No such standard exists for law enforcement. As evidenced by hostage situations
in which police will spend hours on end trying to negotiate with criminals, it is seen as
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completely unacceptable in police work to take actions that are likely to cause injury to
noncombatants. 30
Another difference between the paradigms of war and crime is what is intended to be
the final disposition of those who are captured or apprehended. In war, the final release of
those who are captured is not only thought to be acceptable but is required. As called for in
Article 118 of the Geneva Conventions, “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” 31 In instances of crime, after they are
apprehended, the suspects (who in the United States are not considered guilty until they are
convicted) are prosecuted. If they are convicted, they are punished for their actions. This
punishment, depending on the circumstances of the crime as well as the laws in the venue of
the trial, may include death. This point of distinction is the only one in which the use of
force is heightened on the law enforcement side. So in war, the targeted individual may be
killed up until the point of capture and then must be released at the end of hostilities
(assuming he has not violated any conventions of international law). In instances of crime,
the law enforcer must try to avoid killing the perpetrator, but after apprehension and
conviction it is possible that killing will become acceptable.
One other major distinction between the paradigms of crime and war is the use of
military tribunals or commissions in cases of war (based on the powers granted to Congress
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in Article I of the United States Constitution) 32 and civilian trials (based on the powers
granted to the Judiciary in Article III of the Constitution) 33 in cases of crime. In war,
assuming that there have been no “Offenses against the Law of Nations,” 34 all captured
enemy combatants are released at the cessation of hostilities.

However, when enemy

combatants are accused of violating these laws (e.g., the Geneva Conventions), Article I of
the U.S. Constitution allows that they be brought before a military commission and tried as
war criminals. As defendants under these commissions, enemy combatants do not typically
enjoy the full array of rights reserved to those facing trial in Article III (civilian) courts.
Among the rights that defendants in such instances may be denied are the rights to a jury
trial, indictment, due process, and counsel, as well as protection against self-incrimination.
Military commissions will often have more inclusive evidentiary rules (e.g., sometimes
allowing hearsay and coerced confessions) that tend to work against the defendant. 35
Although these military commissions have most often been limited to use against noncitizens, they have been used against U.S. citizens as well. 36
To summarize, the differences between using a war or crime paradigm are as follows:
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War Rules:
1. Soldiers are primarily responsible for stopping enemy combatants
from committing or contributing to any further hostile actions.
2. Soldiers may kill enemy combatants as long as those individuals are
neither surrendering nor incapacitated.
3. The doctrine of necessity and the Rule of Double Effect allow
soldiers to cause substantial collateral damage, including deaths of
civilians, if such destruction is considered a military necessity and if
the deaths of those civilians are not the primary intention of the
attack.
4. Once an enemy combatant is captured, soldiers must respect the
rights of the captured enemy. The captured enemy may be detained
until the end of hostilities, at which point all prisoners of war who
are not being prosecuted for war crimes by a military commission
must be released.
5. If an enemy combatant is found to have committed a war crime, he
may be prosecuted as part of a military commission as allowed by
Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
Crime Rules:
1. The primary responsibility of law enforcers is the apprehension of
suspects.
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2. Force should be used only as a last resort. When force is used, it is
not for the goal of mission success, but to protect the endangered
well-being of law enforcers and innocent bystanders.
3. Once a suspect is apprehended, if a sufficient amount of evidence is
produced, he will undergo criminal proceedings outlined in Article
III of the United States Constitution.
4. Although defendants will not always enjoy the full array of
constitutional protections (depending on their citizenship or
immigration status), 37 they will almost always enjoy a greater array
of rights than those guaranteed to defendants in military
commissions.

Pros and Cons of Each Paradigm
Both the crime and war paradigms have distinct advantages and disadvantages. In
crime, the primary advantage is that procedures protect suspects’ rights and help to ensure
that only the guilty are punished. The rights of those accused are held to be just as important
as the interests of the state. This emphasis on rights means that “We make the effort to
think through responsibility, we make the effort of proving that responsibility beyond a

certain standard, and then we think about issuing a punishment.” 38 Although it is

possible that a person may be wrongfully convicted of a crime and executed, the
possibility of an innocent person being killed in pursuit of justice is far less likely when
37
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using a crime paradigm, especially since the doctrine of necessity is not seen as
acceptable. This inapplicability of the doctrine of necessity as well as the requirement
of more universal rights protections in criminal proceedings means that the crime

paradigm has more of an emphasis on human rights than that guaranteed by the

paradigm of war. In addition, the satisfaction of justice that may be attained in a wellconducted criminal prosecution will rarely, if ever, be reached in actions following the
paradigm of war.

The benefits of using a war paradigm, on the other hand, spring from the more

loosely required protections of human rights that are often identified as the cons of
such a strategy. First and foremost, the allowance of force under the rules of war means

targeted individuals will rarely be able to carry out any further attacks once identified
and located by military forces.

In law enforcement, the perpetrator is sometimes

allowed to get away if it means pursuit may endanger bystanders. 39 In contrast, war

rules mean that the pursuit of such individuals will be carried on, to varying extents,
even if at times that entails harming innocent bystanders.

Another benefit of using the war paradigm is that the level of success in

preventing enemy combatants from carrying out future attacks is bolstered by the fact

that, for the sake of the mission, soldiers do not have to be as worried about protecting
the rights of bystanders or of those targeted. This makes going after such individuals in

a war paradigm much easier, since soldiers are unconstrained by many of the obstacles
that stand in the way of routine police work. These constraints, when applicable, as in
39
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the paradigm of crime may mean that targeted individuals will more often be able to
escape, and even if captured may end up being freed as a result of rights violations
committed by law enforcers.

Even more importantly, high standards of evidence

required in a criminal paradigm may be extremely difficult if not impossible to satisfy

when dealing with incidents or perpetrators located outside the confines of the United
States and its territories.

Finally, when using a crime paradigm, insufficient evidence will mean that

suspects have to be released. In instances where these suspects are actually dangerous

to society, their release may pose a significant threat. In contrast, the rules of war allow

that enemy combatants be held until the cessation of hostilities. Being able to hold
these combatants for this period of time entails that a lack of evidence will not lead to
their early release and continued threat to society.

However, the fact that these

individuals do have to be released at the end of hostilities (assuming, once again, that

they have not committed war crimes) may leave them free to conduct further acts of
violence in the future, a problem that is not found in the crime paradigm, since
punishment for particularly heinous crimes may lead to sentences of life imprisonment.

Furthermore, since enemy combatants have become harder to distinguish from civilians
(as has been the case in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom),

the war paradigm leaves open the possibility that civilians will be captured by mistake,
and held for an indefinite period of time, a risk to human rights the crime paradigm
does not suffer from.
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Choosing War In Response to 9/11
Beginning with the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been forced to
reorganize its response to and planning for terrorist attacks. The attacks left the question
open as to whether they were criminal actions or acts of war. On one side of the argument
were those who claimed that, in accordance with the scale criterion, the sheer size of the
attacks constituted an act of war. In opposition, there were many who claimed that despite
the scale of the attacks, the fact that they were carried out by members of a nongovernmental organization meant the actions were criminal in nature.
By choosing to go to war in Afghanistan and later is Iraq the Bush Administartion
largely chose a war paradigm (at least internationally). Additionally, the U.S. response has
included, to some extent, elements of the crime paradigm. With those decisions behind us
we can now evaluate whether they were acceptable.

One way of analyzing the Bush

administration’s decisions is to consider whether the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the
U.S. offer guidance in choosing a paradigm.

Whether the choices made by the Bush

administration were in line with those restrictions will be the focus of Section III.
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III

Constitutional/Legal Powers and Restrictions On
Choosing a Model
In evaluating the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 through the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, it makes sense to begin by examining the powers given to and the
restrictions placed upon the government by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. As discussed earlier, use of the war (kill/capture) paradigm usually involves more
infringement on liberty and human rights.

It is safe to say, then, that if there were

Constitutional/legal restrictions on the ability of the government to choose a paradigm, most
of those limitations would be placed upon choosing a war paradigm.

Yet, as will be

discussed in this section, the entire body of laws in the United States leaves the President
nearly free to do as he pleases with the military, especially overseas. Additionally, the
President and Congress face very few restrictions when it comes to the use of military
commissions to prosecute those involved in terrorism and wars against the United States.
The Constitution splits the responsibilities of war and defense between the legislative
and executive branches. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution outlines congressional war
powers:
§1. The Congress shall have the power to…provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; 40
§9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 41
§10. To Define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; 42
40
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41
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§11. To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 43
§12. To raise and support Armies…; 44
§13. To provide and maintain a Navy; 45
§14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces; 46
It is obvious from reading these statements that the war powers granted to the Congress in
the Constitution are vast. The Congress is, here, given the powers not only to set the budget
for the military, but also to regulate the military, to declare war, to set up military tribunals,
and to prosecute those who violate the “Law of Nations” (i.e., war criminals). Article II,
Section 1 outlines the war powers of the Executive, which are not quite so broad:
§1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States; 47
As the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy it is also understood that the President
has the power to lead the Marine Corps (since it is a department of the Navy) and the Air
Force (which did not come into existence until well into the 20th Century).

Also, the

President is responsible for ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed.
On the face of these Articles, it appears that the war powers granted to the legislature
heavily outweigh those of the executive. However, it has historically been the case that the
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President has played a dominant role in taking on and conducting conflicts that follow war
rules. In recognition of this fact, the Congress attempted to reign in presidential power by
passing the War Powers Act of 1973 toward the end of American involvement in Vietnam. 48
As the nation grew more dissatisfied with the ongoing Vietnam War, the legislative branch
began to look into how it could constitutionally limit the power of Presidents to involve
American forces in future conflicts without congressional support.

They turned to the

“necessary and proper clause” of the Constitution.
Article I, Section 8, §18 declares that the Congress shall have the power “To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department of Officer therof.” 49 The legislature took this statement to mean that it had
the authority to make any laws that were needed to enforce its constitutionally enumerated
powers over the military and the conduct of war, even if this meant encroaching upon the
powers the executive believed he possessed.
In passing the War Powers Act, the Congress explicitly stated that the purpose of the
act was to ensure that the legislature, as well as the executive, would share responsibility for
deploying troops in support of hostile actions and for deciding upon their continued
deployment as such campaigns are carried on. 50

In order for this to be the case, the act

explains first that there are only three situations under which a President, acting as
Commander-in-Chief, may deploy troops: there is a declaration of war (made by the
legislature), the legislature makes a law specifically authorizing the use of military force, or
48
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there is “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.” 51 The act (which was vetoed by President Nixon and
eventually passed over his veto 52) attempts to further limit presidential power by setting out
several other requirements in instances where troops are deployed in support of combat
operations (or operations that are likely to involve hostilities) with neither a formal
declaration of war (which the U.S. has not made since World War II) nor a law being passed
to authorize such actions. First, the act requires that the President provide a written report to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate
within forty-eight hours of deploying troops. 53 This report must outline the President’s
reasons for the deployment as well as the projected end of the hostilities. In addition,
following the initial report, the President is required to periodically (and upon request)
provide updated reports.
A second, more heavy-handed restriction on presidential power called for by the War
Powers Act is that the President may only deploy troops for sixty days in the previously
mentioned circumstances unless the legislature declares war, extends the allowance of
deployment for an additional sixty days, or is unable to meet as a result of ongoing
hostilities. 54 Additionally, the President is allowed thirty days to bring the troops home if the
allowable deployment period is not extended, leaving the President with the ability to deploy
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American troops anywhere in the world without congressional approval for a total of ninety
days.
It must be recognized that even with the War Powers Act in place, presidential power
to use the military is vast. First, the War Powers Act does not provide any means to ensure
that the President follows its requirements. Although the legislature could, theoretically, cut
off funding for any war effort, it seems unlikely that it would do so. The President, as the
most highly visible political figure in the U.S., could easily cast members of the legislature
as being against the troops or weak on defense if such funding were restricted (two
possibilities which could be devastating to congressmen and senators when it comes time for
reelection). Additionally, the power to deploy American troops for ninety days gives the
President the ability to respond to terrorist actions, within war rules, anywhere in the world.
Finally, it must be recognized that when it comes to responding to acts of terrorism or
protecting the U.S. against what appear to be threats to U.S. security, the legislature often
seems to go along with Presidential decision making. For example, since the introduction of
the War Powers Act, the Congress has passed specific laws to allow the deployment of
troops in Lebanon, 55 Somalia, 56 Panama, 57 Iraq in 1991 58 and 2002, 59 as well as anywhere in
the world in the Authorization for use of military force against those responsible for attacks
launched against United States on Sept. 11, 2001, which was passed only seven days after
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9/11. 60 In addition, the legislature often passes resolutions in response to presidential actions
in war that do nothing more than voice its disapproval as opposed to taking actions that will
actually have an effect on presidential policies.

One example was House Concurrent

Resolution (HCR) 63, which the House of Representatives passed and the Senate concurred
with in 2007. 61 HCR 63 was passed to show opposition to President Bush’s surge of 20,000
troops in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, as a nonbinding resolution, HCR 63
did nothing to change the policy, and the surge was carried out. Of course, the legislature
could have cut the funding necessary for the surge, which would have made it impossible to
carry out.
This track record seems to show that although the Congress at times has attempted to
hamper the war powers of the President, it has often been compliant and even supportive of
his use of the military for combat operations. The combined power of the legislative and
executive branches has made it the case that the government has often and repeatedly turned
to American hard power and war rules as a way of resolving conflicts with other nations and
non-governmental organizations. The War Powers Act, however, is not the only legal hurdle
that the executive branch has to deal with when choosing a war (kill/capture) paradigm.
Another set of restrictions on the U.S. government when it comes to using war rules
for fighting terrorism are international conventions. Although the President is legally bound
by the U.N. Charter, Article 51 allows that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
60
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maintain international peace and security.” 62 With ongoing terrorist threats and attempted
attacks against the U.S. and its allies, it seems clear that this statement would prevent the
U.N. from standing in the way of U.S. actions to fight terrorism.

The other major

international security agreement the U.S. is a part of is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).

When President George W. Bush feared he would not receive

backing for using war rules in Iraq (three out of five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council were against attacking: China, Russia, and France), he turned to his NATO
allies for support. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof
shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security. 63
The wording in both the U.N. Charter and the NATO Treaty clearly explain that nations
involved have the right to defend themselves against foreign threats. In the case of Iraq,
however, the threat was not so clear. The Bush administration went to great lengths to try to
make connections between Iraq and 9/11.
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administration claimed the threat posed was from Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons
of mass destruction (which also came to naught). Yet, there has been no major international
backlash against the U.S. It seems, then, that the ability of the U.S. to choose war paradigms
(even when it may not be justified) is not really constrained by either NATO or the U.N.
Although there are sometimes self-imposed restraints placed upon the U.S. when it comes to
international charters (these self-imposed restraints, discussed later in this section, mostly
apply to the use of military commissions), it seems that neither the American Constitution
and American laws nor international institutions and laws can prevent the President and
Congress from using war rules in the pursuit of terrorists. The only other restriction on the
use of a kill/capture (war rules) paradigm seems to be posed against the use of the military in
pursuing terrorists within the United States by the Posse Commitatus Act.
The Posse Comitatus Act was passed on June 18, 1878, and has been revised several
times since. 64 Its original enactment came towards the end of the Reconstruction era, in
which the military had continued to occupy the southern states after the northern victory in
the Civil War. Although at its inception the Act referred only to the Army it was later
updated to include the Air Force. The entire text of the Act, as updated in 1956, reads as
follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus 65 or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 66
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As a result of its vague wording, it has mainly been through later court cases and additional
laws that restrictions on the use of the military put forward by the Posse Comitatus Act have
become clear.
Even before the passing of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Insurrection Act of 1807
authorized the President to use the military on property of the states (the Posse Comitatus
Act does not apply to federal land) to suppress “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy” when he felt it was necessary. 67 Further stipulations require that
the state in which the Insurrection Act is applied be unable to suppress the insurrection and
that the President get the consent of either the governor of the state or its legislature. 68 The
fact that the Insurrection Act was not repealed at the signing of the Posse Comitatus Act
meant that the Insurrection Act outlined instances in which the military could still be used to
enforce the law domestically. Presidents used the military under the Insurrection Act several
times in the 20th century: President Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas 69 to
attempt to uphold court ordered desegregation, 70 President Kennedy sent troops to Alabama 71
and Mississippi 72 in response to opposition to desegregation, and President George H.W.
Bush deployed troops to quell riots in Los Angeles. 73
Besides those provided by the Insurrection Act, there are several other exceptions to
the Posse Comitatus Act. First, the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit use of the Coast
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Guard, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security as opposed to the Department
of Defense. Although the Act, in and of itself, does not apply to the Navy, the Department of
Defense has applied the constraints of Posse Comitatus to the Navy as a matter of
Department of Defense policy. 74 However, courts have found that the Navy may be used
domestically to assist the Coast Guard in its duties. 75 In fact, courts have additionally found
that the military may participate in most domestic law enforcement activities as long as its
role is passive and not active, 76 prohibiting such active law enforcement activities as
“…arrest, seizure of evidence, search of person, search of building, investigation of crime,
interviewing witnesses, pursuit of escaped civilian prisoners, search of area for suspects and
other like activities.” 77 Nonetheless, later congressional legislation has allowed the military
to have what appear to be very active roles in drug interdiction and immigration control. 78
One example of the impact such legislation has had may be found in the case of People v.
Wells, 79 in which a court decided that military personnel may act as “undercover informants”
in sting operations without violating the Posse Comitatus Act. Despite this clear erosion of
the Act, the government has in recent years gone even further in undermining its purpose.
Since the Posse Comitatus Act is a law as opposed to an amendment to the
Constitution, subsequent laws can change its provisions with only a majority vote in the
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Congress. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 80
included a small provision that authorized the President to use the military and National
Guard to restore order in cases of natural disaster, epidemic or other public health
emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or domestic violence, or other condition. 81 The only
restriction placed on the President in doing so is that he notifies the Congress within fourteen
days.

The implication of the Act was that the President no longer needed to get the

permission of a state’s governor when he thought troops should be used in accordance with
the Insurrection Act. This shift in power which left the choice of whether to use the military
within the U.S. (under certain circumstances) completely up to the President quickly had
major implications.
Not long after the John Warner Act was passed, President Bush had the 3rd Infantry’s
1st

Brigade

Combat

Team

assigned

to

United

States

Northern

Command

(USNORTHCOM). 82 With its headquarters located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado,
“USNORTHCOM conducts homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to
defend and secure the United States and its interests.” 83 Although USNORTHCOM has been
in existence since 2002 (it was created partly in response to the attacks of 9/11), the
assignment of the 1st BCT marked the first time since the Civil War that active duty military
personnel were given full-time responsibilities for homeland defense within the United
States. The USNORTHCOM website lists its specific mission responsibilities as including
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response to natural disasters, drug interdiction, and terrorist attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction. 84

It was not long, however, until members of Congress noticed the

implications of the John Warner Act.
One of the most outspoken opponents of the John Warner Act was Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT). According to the Senator, section 1076 of the John Warner Act
…‘subverts solid, longstanding posse comitatus statutes
that limit the military’s involvement in law enforcement,
thereby making it easier for the president to declare martial law.
The changes to the Insurrection Act will allow the president to
use the military, including the National Guard, to carry out law
enforcement activities without the consent of a governor.’ 85
Eventually Senator Leahy, along with Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) managed to get the changes
made to the Insurrection Act repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008. 86 However, the President had one more tool to help ensure that his newfound
power over the military was not revoked.
If President Bush had vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (and had the Congress not overridden his veto) it would have done away with the entire
bill, as opposed to the specific provisions he wanted to remove. In 1996 the Congress passed
a law allowing Presidents to perform what are referred to as line-item vetoes. 87 As opposed
to the traditional veto, line-item vetoes gave the President the power to veto specific
provisions of a bill and sign the rest into law, greatly speeding up the law making process.
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However, in 1998 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Clinton v. City of New York, 88
found the line-item veto law to be unconstitutional because it gave the president a type of
law making power (through his ability to amend laws) that the Constitution did not allow.
This would seem to imply that if a President were unhappy with a proposed law, as written,
he would either have to veto the entire bill or sign it into law as is. Yet, that is not the case.
When President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 he
included the following statement:
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 January 28, 2008
Today, I have signed into law H.R. 4986, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. The Act
authorizes funding for the defense of the United States and its
interests abroad, for military construction, and for national
security-related energy programs.
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and
1222, purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the
President’s ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to
take care that the laws be faith- fully executed, to protect
national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch
shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President. 89
Called a signing statement, a short blurb like this is basically a back-door version of a lineitem veto. Although they are nothing new, they have only come into common usage in
recent times.

88

The first presidential signing statement was issued during the Monroe

Clinton v. City of New York. Supreme Court of the United States. 25 June 1998. Lexis
Nexis Academic. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.
89
P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, statement of
President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 4986, Jan. 28, 2008.
43

administration. 90 Between the time of the Monroe and the Reagan administrations, they were
rarely used, and when they were it was most often for their most uncontroversial purpose,
clarification of wording in a law.
Presidential signing statements have three functions.

First, they may be used to

clarify the president’s interpretation of ambiguous parts of a bill. Second, they may be used
to pose Constitutional/legal objections to a portion of a bill. Finally, the statements may be
used to notify members of the Executive branch of how they are to interpret parts of a bill or
to disregard portions of a bill the President believes to be unconstitutional. In the past, the
majority of signing statements were issued with the first purpose in mind: clarification. Yet,
with the most recent Bush administration, a large majority, nearly eight out of every ten
signing statements specifically challenged the constitutionality of provisions of bills that
were signed into law. 91 This was a major change over President Clinton, who only posed
constitutional objections in 18% or 70 out of 381 signing statements. 92 This change in
direction for signing statements in the Bush administration was a sign that the President’s
power to respond as he sees fit has been greatly expanded in recent years. The more than
1,000 provisions labeled as unconstitutional by President Bush included not only the repeal
of the John Warner Act, but also a provision limiting presidential power in the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 93, and the McCain Amendment in
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the Detainee Treatment Act 94 which “prohibited the use of torture, or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of prisoners.” 95
With the use of presidential signing statements becoming common practice, future
and current presidents may find it even easier to use the military as they see fit when
combating terrorism.

In addition, any measure put forward by Congress (short of a

constitutional amendment) to reign in the power of the President can be overridden by more
signing statements. Although these statements may not be in line with the intent of our
founding fathers, the Constitution seems to lack any opposition to their use. Yet, even if the
Supreme Court should eventually restrict the use of presidential signing statements, 96 it is
clear that between the war powers given to the Congress and President through Articles I and
II of the Constitution, respectively; the weakness inherent in the Posse Comitatus Act, and
the lack of binding strength in international charters, that the U.S. government is
constitutionally and legally free to choose a war (kill/capture) paradigm in the fight against
terrorism. The next question to explore, then, is whether the government has the same
constitutional/legal freedom in deciding between prosecuting terrorists as war criminals
under military tribunals and prosecuting terrorists as civilian criminals in courts called for by
Article III of the Constitution.
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Judicial Interference in the Use of Military Tribunals.
Although the roles of the executive & legislative branches seem at times to conflict,
what is clear is that the framers of the Constitution intended that both branches serve a major
role when it comes to the use of the military and ensuring the safety of the American people.
The same cannot necessarily be said when it comes to the judicial branch. Article III of the
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the judicial branch any power over the military,
nor does it state that the Supreme Court has the ability to control the actions of the other
branches. Yet, since Justice Marshall’s 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison it has been
recognized that the Supreme Court, through the power of judicial review, can rule
congressional and executive actions to be unconstitutional. Although the power of judicial
review is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, it has posed what seem to be the most
significant restrictions on presidential and legislative decisions to use military tribunals for
trying terrorists.
One of the first Presidents to have his actions during wartime brought before the
Supreme Court was Abraham Lincoln. In 1863, James L. Vallandigham, a member of the
House of Representatives from Ohio, was arrested for violating General Order No. 38. 97 The
order, which was issued by General Ambrose Burnside, made it a crime to speak out against
the Northern military effort or the Lincoln administration. Vallandigham was charged with
doing both in a speech he gave criticizing Lincoln’s actions in the Civil War. His charges
read as follows:
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Publicly expressing, in violation of General Orders No. 38, from
Head-quarters Department of Ohio, sympathy for those in arms
against the Government of the United States, and declaring
disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of
weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion. 98
Vallandigham was brought before a military commission and convicted of violating
General Order No. 38. He was sentenced to spend the duration of the war as a prisoner in
Fort Warren but President Lincoln commuted his sentence and had Vallandigham sent to
Tennessee, since it was beyond the Northern military lines. 99 Vallandigham subsequently
filed with the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as an attempt to challenge his conviction
by the military commission. The Supreme Court, however, denied Vallandigham’s petition
and decided that they did not have jurisdiction over the military commission. 100 The Court’s
decision left Lincoln with the power to use military commissions throughout the duration of
the war, unobstructed by judicial interference. Yet, it was not long after the end of the Civil
War (and Lincoln’s assassination) that the Supreme Court made a decision, in Ex parte
Milligan, which greatly diverged from their position in the Vallandigham case.
Lambdan P. Milligan, who was an Indiana resident, was sentenced to be hanged by a
military commission in 1864. 101

Although not a member of the military, Milligan was

convicted by a military tribunal of having planned to aid the Confederate war effort.
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Following his conviction, Milligan applied to the Indiana Circuit Court for a writ of habeas
corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus is a court order demanding that the government produce an
imprisoned person for the court so that the court may decide whether the prisoner is being
held lawfully. Although the right to request such writs is not explicitly contained in the
Constitution, Article I contains a prohibition against suspending habeas corpus rights unless
certain circumstances exist: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” 102
In order to aid the war effort in the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the right to
habeas corpus so that citizens who opposed the North could be imprisoned without court
interference. 103

In 1861 Lincoln’s ability to suspend the right of habeas corpus was

challenged in Ex parte Merryman. 104 Although the Merryman Court decided that Lincoln
could not suspend the right, the decision was ignored (until the end of the war) and
Merryman, who was imprisoned, was not produced. 105 It was the fact that Lambdan Milligan
waited until the end of the Civil War to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, which made it
possible for the Court to hear his case.
In Ex parte Milligan the Supreme Court overruled Milligan’s conviction by a military
commission. Although the Court did not challenge the President’s ability to suspend habeas
corpus rights during wartime, it decided that military commissions could not try American
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citizens where Article III courts are fully functional. 106107 Brushing previous court rulings
off as having been made in error as a result of “the temper of the times,” the Supreme Court
also ruled that military tribunals could only be used for civilians as a last resort, when no one
other than the military can handle the trials. 108 The strong stance of the Court in Milligan
was a far cry from the earlier court decisions around the time of the Civil War. This strong
stance, though, would not remain set in stone as the issue of military commissions would
once again be brought before the Supreme Court seventy-six years later in Ex parte Quirin.
Once again at war, the U.S. government made use of military commissions in 1942.
Ex parte Quirin involved eight German saboteurs who had ridden a German submarine to the
eastern coast of the United States. 109

Once they reached the shore the eight men, who had

been carrying “explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices,” removed their
uniforms. They were subsequently apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and
tried before a military commission for violating “the law of war and the Articles of War, 10
U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593.” 110 Despite the fact that one of the saboteurs was an American
citizen, all eight were sentenced to death. The saboteurs then petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently for a writ of certiorari, both of which were
granted.
In their argument to the Supreme Court, the saboteurs claimed that their fifth and
sixth amendment rights had been violated: the rights to due process and trial by jury,

106

Indiana was not a rebellious state.
Ex parte Milligan.
108
Ex parte Milligan.
109
Ex parte Quirin. Supreme Court of the United States. 31 July 1942. LexisNexis Academic.
Web. 12 Jan. 2011.
110
Ex parte Quirin.
49
107

respectively. The saboteurs also claimed that they could not be labeled as enemy belligerents
(which was necessary to their being tried by a military commission) since they had not
carried out their plans. Finally, the saboteurs cited the decision in Ex parte Milligan to show
that the Court had previously forbade the use of military commissions, particularly of
American citizens, (as one of the defendants, Herbert Haupt, was in this case) when civilian
courts were functioning properly.
In response to the claims of the saboteurs, the Supreme Court first explained that the
rights provided by the fifth and sixth amendments did not preclude the use of military
commissions (which could exclude these rights) for violations of the laws of war. The Court
also decided that whether the saboteurs had been successful in completing their goals was
irrelevant since they had removed their uniforms within the United States (violating the laws
of war) in order to carry out their plans. Finally, the Court responded to the citation of Ex
parte Milligan. Although it seemed that Haupt’s situation was analogous to that of Milligan
(they both intended to assist an enemy force in damaging the ability of the U.S. military), the
Court found that the holding in Ex parte Milligan did not apply to the situation in Ex parte
Quirin.

According to Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, “Milligan, not being a part of or

associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law
of war save as -- in circumstances found not there to be present, and not involved here -martial law might be constitutionally established.” 111

In other words, Milligan was not

closely associated with enemy forces to the extent that he could be labeled as an enemy
belligerent and tried by a military commission. Although Chief Justice Stone refrained from
setting out exact instructions on when an American citizen can and cannot be labeled an
111
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enemy belligerent, he made it clear that Haupt fell within the former category. 112 Six of the
eight men were executed in 1942, with the other two having their death sentences commuted
by President Roosevelt, to thirty years for one and life in prison for the other. 113 The
decision by the Court in Ex parte Quirin gave the President much more leeway to use
military commissions in the future, and signaled a stepping back of the Court from the strong
posture it took in Ex parte Milligan.
Not long after Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court made decisions in Korematsu v.
United States (1944) and Johnson v. Eisenstrager (1950), both of which further bolstered the
power of the President in times where national security seemed to be at risk. In Korematsu
v. United States, Justice Black decided that it was constitutional for the President to relocate
persons of Japanese decent on the West Coast to internment camps during World War II. In
Johnson v. Eisenstrager, the court decided that it had no jurisdiction over German war
criminals held by the American military overseas. This left the President free, once again, to
use military commissions without interference from the Supreme Court. Even without the
use of military commissions, though, the executive branch has strong powers to try those
who are not American citizens (which constitute a large portion of those accused of terrorist
activities) before Article III courts, since several court decisions have shown that noncitizens do not enjoy the full range of constitutional protections guaranteed to citizens.
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In 1990 the Supreme Court heard U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 114 Urquidez was a
Mexican citizen brought to the United States on drug-related charges.

The U.S. Drug

Enforcement Agency, with the consent of Mexican authorities had searched the Urquidez
residence in Mexico without a search warrant. At trial, Urquidez claimed that the evidence
collected during the DEA’s investigation was inadmissible, since the fourth amendment bars
unreasonable search and seizure.

In his decision, Justice Rehnquist explained that the

wording of the Bill of Rights, in some sections, specifically refers to “the people” as those to
whom certain rights apply. According to Justice Rehnquist, it would seem that "the people"
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” 115 His decision in
this case implied that not only are those who are labeled as enemy belligerents allowed to be
tried before military tribunals with limited rights, but that those people who are not part of
the American “community” may be tried by Article III courts without the full array of
Constitutional rights as well. Indeed, it was only two years later that Chief Justice Rehnquist
decided in US v. Alvarez-Machain that those who were accused of violating American laws
could be tried within the United States no matter how they came to be here, even if that
included (as it did in the Machain case) forcible abduction. 116
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It seemed clear, then, that well into the 1990s the ability of the executive branch to try
enemy belligerents (including American citizens) and those who were not part of the
American community was largely unopposed by the courts. Military tribunals could try
enemy belligerents, while only allowing them to enjoy limited rights. Those who were not
enemy belligerents yet could still be cast as outside the American community (and some
strong arguments have been made that those who participate in terrorist activities remove
themselves from the American community 117) could be tried in Article III courts with limited
rights as well. To most American citizens, these issues did not seem particularly salient. In
more recent times, however, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror have
brought these issues to the forefront. A series of cases following 9/11 has brought further
investigation into what resistance courts will may pose to decisions of the President and
national security/law enforcement officials in trying those believed to be involved in terrorist
activities.
In June, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in two cases, Rasul v. Bush 118
and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 119 which may have been the strongest stands the Court has made
against a President’s power to limit habeas corpus rights since Ex Part Milligan. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld concerned an American citizen, Yaser Hamdi, who was captured by American
forces fighting in Afghanistan. Detained as an “enemy combatant,” he was to be held until
the end of hostilities in the War on Terror as was authorized by Congress’s Authorization for
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Use of Military Force. 120 Although the Court in Hamdi recognized that it was well within
the power of the President (when authorized by Congress) to hold enemy combatants
throughout the duration of hostilities, it decided that detainees must be given the opportunity
to challenge the designation before a neutral decision maker as part of their right to due
process. 121 According to James Wilson Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of
Law, Robert J. Pushaw Jr., “Hamdi represented the first time the Court had ever recognized
that Congress authorized a presidential war power, yet had struck it down as
unconstitutional.” 122 As Pushaw explains in his article “Creating Legal Rights For Suspected
Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?” 123 the Court’s decision
was most likely the result of several circumstances arising around the time of Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.
As the only unelected branch of the federal government, the judiciary is inherently
undemocratic. In order to balance this with the idea of America as a “government of the
people, by the people, and for the people,” 124 the Supreme Court must be careful to choose
its battles with the other branches carefully. Although we do have a system of checks and
balances, judicial review tends to make the court look political. This is why, as Pushaw
points out, the Supreme Court is most likely to interfere with congressional and presidential
actions in reference to national security issues when (i) the severity of the threat has
120
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diminished, (ii) the support of Congress for the President has waned, (iii) the severity of
intrusion on individual rights is high, and (iv) the political strength of the President is low. 125
All of these factors seemed to have come into play at the time of Ex parte Milligan and they
were also coming into effect around the time of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: It had been several
years since 9/11, President Bush’s approval rating had begun to dip below 50%, 126 and it
seemed possible that those detained in the War on Terror could be held permanently. 127 The
only factor that was not fulfilled was the waning in congressional support, but along with
Bush’s approval ratings, it would have seemed likely at the time that Bush would lose
Republican seats in the House of Representatives and Senate in the 2006 mid-term elections.
On the same day that the Supreme Court released its decision on the Hamdi case, it
also rendered its decision in Rasul v. Bush. 128 Rasul v. Bush concerned four non-American
detainees in the War on Terror who were being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The

detainees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which the government
claimed they could not do since they were neither American citizens nor were they being
held in an area under U.S. sovereignty. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens decided that the Court
did have jurisdiction over the detainees and that habeas corpus rights were not limited to
American citizens. 129

Rasul, like Hamdi, was a major blow to the efforts of the Bush

administration in battling terrorism. Yet, following the loss of Republican control of the
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House of Representatives and the Senate in 2006, the weakened President would still have
two more cases in which the Supreme Court stood in defiance.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, the Department of
Defense created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT), which gave detainees at
Guantanamo Bay the opportunity to challenge their designation as enemy combatants. 130
Additionally, the Congress issued the Military Commissions Act of 2006 131 which
“authorized and formalized the creation and use of military commissions for [trying those
designated as enemy combatants].” 132 Still the Court became even bolder in 2006 with the
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 133
When another detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Salim Hamdan, was designated as an
enemy combatant (in accordance with the standards required in the CSRT), he filed for a writ
of habeas corpus. Although the writ was granted by a district court and then denied by the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court quickly granted Hamdan’s petition.
The Court decided to hear the case despite the fact that Congress “then enacted DTA section
1005(e) (1), which provided that as of December 30, 2005, ‘no court, justice, or judge’ had
jurisdiction to consider habeas actions by alien detainees at Guantanamo.” 134 In its decision,
the Court explained that the particular military tribunal was illegal because it had violated
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both the Geneva Convention and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. 135 Although this
decision did not completely ban the use of military commissions it did require that different
procedures be used when prosecuting detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Congress
passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, part of which explicitly gave the President
power to continue trying enemy combatants before military commissions. 136 However, the
Supreme Court, once again, restricted this power by ruling in Boumedine v. Bush, that the
portion of the Act that authorized the commissions violated habeas corpus rights protected by
the Constitution. This decision was later followed by another Act authorizing executive use
of military commissions: the Military Commissions Act of 2009. 137 Although the Act still
allows the use of military commissions for trying enemy combatants, it outlines the rules for
the commissions as being much closer to those rules applied in Article III courts, making it
more likely that the rights of those prosecuted will be protected. This once again means that
the executive branch can continue trying those captured or arrested for acts of terrorism
under either military commissions or Article III trials. What the future holds for Supreme
Court interference is not completely clear, but in order to avoid being drawn further into the
political realm, the Court will most likely keep a lower profile when it comes to these matters
in the near future. It also remains to be seen what the President’s next steps will be in
dealing with those held at Guantanamo, since the first high-profile trials of detainees are only
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really beginning to take place now. 138 What can be said is that if the current political
situation changes (e.g., a President comes into power with a higher approval rating or there is
another major terrorist attack) the Court will be much less likely to stand in the President’s
way. Additionally, as pointed out by Pushaw:
America has experienced cycles before in which the
Court has asserted broad authority to review the exercise of war
powers. But that approach has never lasted. Rather, the Justices
typically have exercised their discretion to yield to the political
branches in military matters, often because they had no other
realistic choice.
This history suggests that the “enemy
combatant” cases will not have a profound lasting impact. 139
After reviewing the constitutional war powers granted to the executive and legislative
branches and the subsequent legislation and case law, it seems clear that when it comes to
choosing between a war (kill/capture) or crime (arrest/prosecute) paradigm the government is
relatively unconstrained. Despite the fact that there have recently been some minor obstacles
put before the President in deciding whether to use military commissions or Article III courts
to prosecute terrorists, the authority of the President to make the final decision will
eventually win out. Therefore, it seems clear that by responding to 9/11 with the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration acted both constitutionally and legally. Yet,
there is more to evaluating the actions of our government in response to terrorism than legal
evaluation. In addition to being legal, we tend to want our government to do what is “right.”
That is why the Section IV will provide an ethical evaluation of the Bush administration’s
response to 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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IV

Ethical Considerations
In evaluating our current counter-terrorism policy, one important consideration we
should take into account is the policy’s ethical basis. In this section, the moral basis for the
current U.S. “war on terror” will be evaluated. Additionally, I will consider not only whether
the current wars are just, but also whether there can be such a thing as a just counter-terror
war. Finally, I will make an ethical evaluation of the U.S. hybridization of the war and crime
paradigms as part of U.S. counter-terror policy.
Although there are some who would deny the existence of an objective morality, that
view does not seem to correspond with our intuitions about the world. On a daily basis we
all make judgments and evaluations about what is right or wrong. We try to edify our moral
values to our children, 140 our elders and our teachers try to pass their values on to us, and we
like to think that we are doing our best to live up to these values. There are certainly
instances where morality is clear (e.g., the Holocaust was obviously a moral outrage), but
there are also instances in which it is more difficult to identify which actions are or are not
morally acceptable (Philippa Foot’s “trolley problem” is a particularly troubling example 141).
Yet, despite these complications, we all seem to have some sense of what is generally right
and wrong (e.g., most people seem to recognize that donating money to charity is good and
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murdering is bad, even if they don’t do what is right in either instance). There is no good
reason, then, to exclude this sense of ethics from our political decision-making.
When it comes to our choice of paradigms for counter-terrorism policy, the crime
paradigm seems morally uncontroversial. Although there have been many critiques made
about pre-9/11 U.S. counter-terrorism policy, these critiques have been aimed more at the
policy’s inefficiency or poor organization than at any moral deficiencies. In vast contrast, it
seems that a large portion of the critiques of the post-9/11 policy have been morally based.
For example, Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University, David Luban, has
said that the particular style of the U.S. war on terror “increased American power while
decreasing the rights of both the enemy and the innocent bystander.” 142 For this reason it
makes sense, first, to assess whether the war on terror has been morally just.
In order to evaluate the morality of the war on terror we need some sort of ethical
framework from which to judge it. Unfortunately, making a moral assessment of a war is a
complicated process, which neither Kantian Deontology nor Utilitarianism, two of the most
prominent ethical theories, can satisfactorily accomplish.

The Shortcomings of Kantian Deontology
Kantian Deontology, based on the ethical views of the German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant, claims that in order to evaluate the morality of actions we need to test them
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against what he calls the Categorical Imperative. 143 In the Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gave two versions of the Categorical Imperative:
1. Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law. 144
2. So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only. 145
Without getting too far into analysis of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, what can be said is
that neither version offers a clear guiding principle for how to act in war. In Kant’s first
version, he is claiming that each time we act, our action can be thought of as following a
maxim (for example, if someone robs a bank, they are following the maxim “I will rob a
bank.”). He then explains that our action is only morally acceptable if we, the person
performing the action, would find it acceptable that everyone acts according to that maxim.
The implication of this is that for it to be moral for me to rob a bank I must find it acceptable
that everyone rob a bank. A hidden issue here, though, is that Kant seems to assume the
rationality of all people. In other words, the first version of the Categorical Imperative
would lead to the implication that if a suicidal leader of a nuclear power (leader X) found it
acceptable that everyone act on the maxim “I will fire my nuclear weapons at neighboring
states,” it would be morally acceptable for leader X to do so. Of course, one could attempt to
salvage this version of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that making these judgments
143
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should be restricted to rational people, but then it will become very complicated to figure out
who can and who cannot make moral judgments.

Additionally, it seems possible that

rational people would disagree about which maxims are acceptable, leaving us with the same
action being immoral for some and moral for other.
The second version of the Categorical Imperative also has some problems. In the
second version, Kant is claiming that we ought to treat people not as means, but as ends in
themselves. When it comes to the military, this is particularly troubling because almost
every order given from a superior to an inferior serviceman treats that serviceman as a means
to accomplish whatever end the superior had in mind.

Yet it certainly seems morally

acceptable for a senior officer to ask his soldiers, for example, to defend their position should
they come under attack. In such an instance the officer is treating his soldiers as means to
accomplishing the end of protecting their position. According to Kant, then, the officer is
acting immorally. Of course, this same problem of superiors treating inferiors as means to
ends would arise in all hierarchical organizations (e.g., police departments, the Department
of Motor Vehicle, etc…). With problems of this sort, it is clear that neither version of Kant’s
Categorical Imperative is up to the task of evaluating actions in war. Although Utilitarianism
suffers from different problems, it will not be up to the task of performing the evaluations
needed here either.

The Shortcomings of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, which is arguably the best-known version of consequentialism, goes in
the opposite direction of Kant’s theory by judging actions not by the intent of the actor but
by the results of each action.

In his book, Utilitarianism, the British philosopher, John
62

Stuart Mill, claimed, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems
natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are
subservient.” 146 The specific end that Mill felt each action should be measured by was the
amount of happiness or as Mill called it, utility, it brought to the world. So in the case of
choosing between two actions, one must always choose that which would have the greatest
utility, i.e., produce the most happiness.

Yet, despite Utilitarianism’s seeming clarity

compared to Kantian Deontology, some of its implications are wildly counter-intuitive.
One problem with Utilitarianism is that is fails to grasp the fact that as people, we tend
to judge the morality of actions not only by their results, but by the intended purpose of the
action as well. So, for example, helping an elderly woman to cross the street because we feel
it is the right thing to do, according to most intuitions, is morally better than helping her
across the street because we are hoping she will give us a few dollars in return.

Yet,

utilitarianism would claim that these actions are morally equivalent if they have the same
result. Likewise, if while attempting to cross the street we were to trip and accidentally
knock the elderly woman in front of a bus, Mill would have us believe that this was no
different than had we intentionally shoved the woman in front of the bus (assuming that the
utility or negative utility produced by each action was the same).

In response to this,

utilitarian philosophers would likely claim that the problem lies not in Utilitarianism but in
our intuitions. Yet even if we were to accept that intentions do not matter, there are still
actions that can be justified by Utilitarianism which are not only counter-intuitive but seem
to be morally repugnant.
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Although there are many horrible actions that can be justified by Utilitarianism (Judith
Jarvis Thomson’s organ harvest 147 and Robert Nozick’s experience machine 148 scenarios do a
great job of pointing out some examples), these atrocities seem to be most salient when
utilitarian judgments are made regarding war. Since the only goal of Utilitarianism is to
maximize the amount of happiness in the world, it seems that this can justify outrageous acts
of inhumanity. For example, imagine that there is a school filled with 200 innocent children
in country X. Additionally, the leader of country X, leader X, is getting ready to wage a war
against country Y that will cost thousands of lives on either side. However, if country Y
were to bomb the school and kill all the children, leader X would likely call off the war (this
can be for any number of reasons, e.g., war would be politically unpopular after such a
massacre). According to Utilitarianism, if the calculations show that by killing the children,
country Y can preserve the lives of thousands of others and maximize the amount of
happiness in the world, it would be morally acceptable for Country Y to carry out the attack.
As should be clear, this logic can lead to the result that horrendous actions in war are morally
acceptable.

What must be recognized is that the main fault in Utilitarianism is that it

disregards each individual’s right to life (which was discussed in Section I). To recap, as
humans we enjoy certain basic rights. Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer
Professor of Law at New York University, Rondald Dworkin, may best explain this in his
book Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties:
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Among the most fundamental of all moral principles is the
principle of shared humanity: that every human life has a
distinct and equal inherent value. This principle is the
indispensable premise of the idea of human rights, that is, the
rights people have just in virtue of being human.... 149
Most fundamental amongst these rights is the right to life. If as humans we have any rights,
certainly one of them must be the right to continue living. Furthermore, this right to life
must imply some duty on others not to interfere with it, for it is otherwise nearly
meaningless. This means that, not only do we have a right to continue living, but that others
are morally required not to interfere with that right. In the previously discussed case of
country Y bombing a school in country X, the bombing would directly interfere with the
right to life of the children and so is immoral. Regardless of whether people would generally
be better off, bombing the school ignores the individual right to life of each child in the
school.
Since it is clear that the two most prominent moral theories run into so many problems
when it comes to war, any moral evaluation must use alternative means. In order to evaluate
war, then, the best approach would be to focus on a more practical moral assessment.
Instead of taking a universal moral principle and then trying to apply it to all situations,
including war, it would be more useful to simply codify the factors that make actions in war
just or unjust. One approach, and the approach which I believe better accounts for the
individual right to life, is what is known as Just War Theory.
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Just War Theory
Just War Theory is a collection of doctrines that have been examined by philosophers
stretching as far back as Aristotle in ancient Greece 150 to contemporary philosophers, most
notably the Institute for Advanced Study’s Michael Walzer. The basis of the doctrines lie on
a continuum between pacifism and realism. The Just War theorist denies the pacifist’s claim
that going to war is never justified, while also denying the realist’s claim that morality
should have no role in war. Not only does this view seem to bode well with most of our
intuitions but it has, additionally, served in some way as a guide for U.S. Presidents. Just to
give a few examples, Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Jimmy Carter have all
claimed to have been influenced, at times, by Just War Theory. 151 Most recently, while
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in December of 2009, President Obama pointed out that
“There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of
force not only necessary but morally justified.” 152 It will be useful, then, both to evaluate
whether Just War Theory gives us morally acceptable rules to follow in a counter-terror war,
as well as whether those rules have been followed in the War on Terror.
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Just War Theory is
traditionally broken up into three parts: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. 153
Jus ad bellum or the “law up to war” deals with distinguishing under what conditions a group
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may go to war. Jus in bello, which means “law in war” governs what may be done within a
war. Finally, jus post bellum or “law after war” deals with what conditions are morally
required at the conclusion of war. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are still under way
(despite the President’s claims that “combat-operations” have ended in Iraq), I will not
consider jus post bellum. I will, thus, begin this analysis with jus ad bellum.

Jus Ad Bellum
In order to begin a just war, there are several jus ad bellum criteria that must be met.
The first, and possibly the most important, is that the war has a just cause. Although, in the
past, just cause has been thought to include many different factors, today, according to a
Baruch College Professor of Philosophy, Douglas P. Lackey, the only cause for war that can
be considered just is “self-defense.” 154

Although the cause of self-defense has been

expanded lately to include defense of others, as well as preemption (going to war prior to an
impending attack), it has not been expanded to include prevention (going to war to prevent
the possibility of a future attack). Simply based on this initial criterion, it is clear that the
war in Iraq has been unjust.
In the Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, there
were several reasons cited for the war. 155 Amongst those reasons were the Iraqi regime’s
possession of WMDs, their connection to the 9/11 attacks, and their providing safe havens
for terrorists. Although it seems that any one of these reasons could have added support for,
if not satisfied the requirements of the first criterion of jus ad bellum, nearly eight years after
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the initial invasion it seems clear that none of the three justifications had any credibility. In
fact, the entire basis of the claim that Saddam had a fully functioning WMD program seems
to have been based on faulty intelligence provided by a single individual. 156 After the
invasion of Iraq failed to yield any sign of a WMD program, it seems that the war had shifted
from having justifications based on actual self-defense to justifications based on the spread
of democracy and defeat of terrorists who had moved into Iraq to create an insurgency. What
is clear, then, is that the war in Iraq was not undertaken in response to an actual, but to a
perceived need for self-defense.
Last September, Jeffrey Montrose pointed out in the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s
Journal, Think, “Because the evidence given for the war [in Iraq], namely weapons of mass
destruction, proved to never exist, it wouldn’t be too hard to argue the war as unjust.” 157 In
fact, it is simply based on the first criterion of jus ad bellum that the war is shown to be
unjust. There was neither an actual attack nor a pending attack on the U.S. by Iraq, nor was
there an ongoing massacre of Iraqi civilians for the U.S. to stop (the defense of others can
only be used to justify going to war when there is ongoing or impending harm posed by the
aggressor state).

As pointed out by a Boston University professor, Neta Crawford, in

referring to the war in Iraq, “the administration’s ‘preemption’ strategy is actually, in large
degree, a preventive (early offensive) war strategy that seeks to maintain U.S. preeminence
by reducing or eliminating the military capabilities of potential adversaries even before
potential rivals have acquired those capabilities—and in the absence of clear intention and
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plans to use weapons against the United States.” 158 The lack of a just cause for Operation
Iraqi Freedom meant that the war was unjust and so will require no further analysis.
Fortunately, the same critique cannot be made of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
The U.S. went to war in Afghanistan in direct response to the attacks of 9/11, which,
according to the principles of jus ad bellum, provided a just cause for Operation Enduring
Freedom.

Of course, there were other factors that went into the decision to invade

Afghanistan, but in general, it seems that the U.S. was justified in responding to 9/11 with
such an attack. To further clarify, I would say that an attack like 9/11 can be seen as a just
cause for going to war based on the rights to life that have been discussed throughout this
paper.
As was mentioned earlier, individuals enjoy a right to life that implies a
corresponding duty on others not to interfere with that right. In addition, I would say that
this right to life implies a right to self-defense. If a right to continue living is to have any
substance, it must be the case that one is justified in defending their right life should others
try to interfere with it. Additionally, I believe that one can view a country, such as the
United States, as a collection of people who enjoy a right to life. In circumstances such as
ours, in which we become part of the same society, it seems that there would clearly be some
collective right to self-defense: Just as a mother is justified not only in defending the rights
to life of herself but of her children, the members of a society are not only justified in
defending their own right to life but the right to life of their fellow citizens. As was the case
with 9/11 (and the continued existence of Al Qaida), although it was only New York and
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Washington, D.C. that came under attack, the collective right of self-defense in the United
States meant that the country had a right to defend itself against further attack.
It is not only a just cause, though, that is required for jus ad bellum to be satisfied. In
order to further analyze whether Operation Enduring Freedom is a just war, it must be tested
against all of the other criteria of jus ad bellum, which are as follows:
1. A just war must be fought for the purpose of peace and
reconciliation. 159
2. A just war must be fought as a last resort. 160
3. A just war must be undertaken by a legitimate or
“competent” authority. 161
4. A just war must have a probability of success. 162
5. A just war must have ends proportional in good to the evil
associated with war. 163
Although there have been attempts at formulating additional criteria, these five plus the
original just cause criterion seem to be universally accepted amongst Just War theorists. In
fact, the leading modern Just War theorist, Michael Walzer, supported all of these criteria in
his book, Just and Unjust Wars. 164 Additionally, these criteria are particularly useful in their
relative clarity compared to theories like Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology. First, the
requirement of fighting for peace simply means that the goal of the war should not be
retribution or justice. This requirement is based on the idea that war is an intrinsically bad
thing and should only be conducted for the purpose of limiting further violence (and not for
the sake of punishing aggressors). On a similar line of thought, the second criterion points
159

Crawford 7.
Crawford 7.
161
Lackey 162.
162
Orend.
163
Orend.
164
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations.
New York: Basic, 2006. Print.
70
160

out that since war is bad, alternate means of accomplishing its goals should be sought before
it is used. How much of an effort is required when attempting to seek alternative means to
war is not completely clear, but as was the case with the actions of the Bush administration,
the opposing state or group should be offered some means through which to avoid war. 165
The third criterion, that a just war requires a legitimate or competent authority simply
limits wars to being undertaken by sovereign or legitimate powers, which in most cases (but
not always) are states. The fourth and fifth requirements, similar to the first and second,
recognize that war is bad and so require that a war be likely to end in success (otherwise
undertaking the war would cause pointless suffering) and that there be some measure of
proportionality in undertaking the war (you should not launch a war which may kill
thousands over a single bullet shot across a border), respectively.
Of the jus ad bellum criteria, they all seem to be not only reasonable restrictions on
war but neither overly restrictive nor overly permissive. First, if all nations followed them
there would obviously be no wars (since the only justified attacks are made in self-defense).
Even in the event that there are wars (as a result of one group being an aggressor), they
would only be fought under limited circumstances that eliminate wars that are immoral.
Additionally, it seems that the U.S., in deciding to go to war in Afghanistan, has followed
these criteria to some extent. There are a few critiques that some may raise (e.g., the U.S.
went to war for the sake of retribution or the war was not fought as a last resort) but it seems
that the U.S. made a reasonably just decision in deciding to go to war in response to 9/11.
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When it comes to the criteria of jus in bello, however, Operation Enduring Freedom has not
done quite so well.

Jus In Bello
Although there have been many different attempts at making clear restrictions on
what is and is not permissible conduct in war, there are three principles which are central to
jus in bello: necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. 166 Necessity is the requirement
that any combative action taken in war be necessary, or in other words, serve the aim of
successfully completing the war. This means that killing, just for the sake of killing is
prohibited. In addition, as Crawford points out, “The proportionality criterion [distinct from
the jus ad bellum requirement] prescribes that violence be in proportion to the aims of war;
gratuitous violence should be avoided.” 167

Finally, the principle of discrimination, also

known as the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity, draws a line between
who and what is and is not an acceptable target of attack.

According to Brian Orend,

Director of International Studies and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo,
the principle of discrimination requires that “armies are to discriminate or distinguish
between military and civilian targets, and aim their lethal force only at legitimate military,
and military supply, targets.” 168 The typical sentiment, then, is that it is morally acceptable
to attack combatants and unacceptable to attack “innocents.” As a side note, the term

“innocence,” when it comes to war does not refer to someone’s lack of guilt or as New
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York University professor; Thomas Nagel calls it, “moral innocence.” 169 In war
innocence is a reference to whether someone directly contributes to the harm posed by
a combative force, e.g., innocents are civilians and non-innocents are combatants.

In addition to these three principles, one common restriction is on the types of tactics

and weapons used in war, so as to avoid a feeling of future animosity that will make a lasting
peace less likely.

Typically referred to as means mala in se (wrong in itself), these

restrictions are on the use of weapons and tactics that are considered particularly brutal or
indiscriminate (these include flamethrowers, napalm, cluster bombs, chemical and biological
agents, etc….). 170
In evaluating the war in Afghanistan, it is particularly tough to identify violations of
the necessity and proportionality doctrines. Especially since the war is ongoing, it is tough
to say whether, for example, all of the actions being taken are necessary for the success of
the war, although it is likely that some were not. Yet, with the lack obvious violations of
either principle at this point in time, we can assume that, for the most part, American actions
in Afghanistan have stayed within the confines of proportionality and necessity. The same
cannot necessarily be said, though, for the principle of discrimination.
When it comes to the principle of discrimination, it stands out that what is banned is
the killing of civilians, yet it goes without saying that there are not and most likely have
never been any wars free of civilian death. This leaves the Just War theorist in a tough
position: either allow that there be some justifiable civilian deaths or accept that there can
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only be theoretical but not actual just wars. It is in response to this point that the principle of
double effect is added to the just war doctrine.

Double Effect
The principle of double effect draws a distinction between intentions and effects. In
war, it is said, that when a justified attack is carried out against an appropriate target,
foreseeable civilian casualties are not the moral responsibility of the attacker.

In other

words, the attacker is responsible for the destruction caused to the intended target (the
military target) but is not responsible for the civilian deaths since they were not intended but
were just a side effect or collateral damage. Although this may sound suspect at first, we do
actually apply the doctrine of double effect in our daily lives.

For example, when

construction workers create roads or when engineers build cars, it is foreseeable that some
people will die as a result (the Center for Disease Control counted 42,031 motor vehicle
traffic deaths in the U.S. in 2007). 171 We do not, however, think that what the construction
workers and engineers do is immoral. It seems correct to say that their intentions were only
to provide us with cars and roads and that any deaths that result were just an unfortunate side
effect that they did not intend. Now, what must be said is that, as Walzer points out, “due
care” must be taken to avoid unnecessary negative side effects. 172 So, for example, should
the factory worker run out of screws and use bubble gum to secure a tire or the construction
worker fails to put up stop signs at the corner of adjacent streets, we would say that although
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they did not intend resultant deaths they are still morally responsible. The same due care
should be applied in war before double effect is allowed to be used.
In response to the aforementioned examples of the application of double effect, it may
certainly be noted that construction and vehicle production are not clearly analogous to
actions in war. What must be recognized, though, is that when we judge the morality of
people’s actions, especially when they have some bad results, we give a large amount of
weight to their intentions. This is exactly why double effect is so important: it restricts moral
blame to the intentions of actions, as long as the actor took due care to avoid other negative
effects. For the sake of clarification, another scenario should be helpful.
Imagine a pilot is attempting to land a passenger plane, but he misjudges the approach
to the runway and ends up hitting a large office building. On 9/11 we found the results of
such an action (flying a plane into a building) to be morally horrendous. 173 Yet although the
results of the pilot’s actions are the same as those of the hijackers, we would probably think
of it as more of a tragedy than a moral outrage. So, in this case, with the results being
identical, the distinguishing feature is that the hijackers intended to kill innocent people and
the pilot did not. If the pilot failed to take due care (for instance, if he was drunk), we would
feel that he was morally responsible, but in this case he was not. Of course, there are still
discrepancies between this scenario and actions in war. As a result, one may claim that while
double effect applies in this case, it does not in war because the pilot here did not intend to
kill anyone and was also a victim himself. Both of these issues, however, can be easily
resolved.
173

Of course, the hijackers did not think their actions were morally repugnant. However, I
would assume that had American terrorists performed similar attacks in the Middle East, the
9/11 hijackers would think the American actions were horrendous.
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Imagine one more scenario. Again, there is a pilot, but this time of a fighter jet.
When attempting to maneuver for a bombing run on some enemy combatants, the pilot
misjudges his approach and is about to crash into an office building. This time, though, the
pilot manages to eject himself in the nick of time, but the plane still crashes into the building,
killing innocent people. Again, imagine that the pilot took due care: he honestly believed he
would not hit the building, there was no other way for him to approach the targeted
individuals, and the people in the building were notified beforehand that they should
evacuate but chose not to. In this case, it still seems that the pilot is not morally responsible
for the deaths of the innocent individuals. So, it must be the case that double effect can
apply in war, as well. In order to explain how this works further what is really needed is an
account of when deaths in war are and are not morally acceptable, especially if a final
evaluation of the war in Afghanistan is going to be possible.
Earlier in this section I rejected the use of purely Utilitarian reasoning for evaluating
the morality of warfare. The problem with the Utilitarian principle seemed to be that it
counts people strictly as functions of utility, not as individual people who have rights. It
seemed that, in some way, no matter what the results of not attacking the school full of
children in the scenario I provided would be, there was just something horrible about doing it
(even if the results of not doing it would turn out worse for other people). What I think can
help provide us with a better guide than Utilitarian calculations is creating a framework,
based around rights of individuals, to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
attacks. In order to formulate this framework, it will be necessary further to distinguish
between innocents and combatants by breaking people up into the following categories
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according to the rights they enjoy: innocent civilians, passively complacent civilians,
actively complacent civilians, child soldiers, and combatants/soldiers.

Categories of Individuals
What I will say first is that if we are going to have a moral war there must be a
complete prohibition on intentionally attacking civilians. I would attribute this both to the
idea that attacks of this sort are intentional violations of noncombatants’ rights to life and
also to the fact that civilians pose no direct threat to the opposing force. It is the fact that by
becoming combatants people directly contribute to the harm posed by a combatant force that
they become legitimate targets of attack. Likewise, it is because noncombatants do not
directly (although they may indirectly) contribute to this threat that they are not. 174
Additionally, if one claims that it is morally acceptable for civilians to be the direct object of
attack under the doctrine of double effect (for example, the claim might be made that the
intention of the attack is really to end a war more quickly by forcing the opposing
government into surrender, and that the civilian deaths are side effects), they would have to
make the same evaluations of some terrorist attacks. In fact, it must be said that not only are
terrorist attacks immoral (since by nature they are attacks on innocents) but that, as pointed
out in section I of this paper, many of the allied attacks in World War II both on Japan and
Germany targeted the civilian populations, and so were not only immoral but were actually
acts of terrorism themselves. It seems, then, that we must account for the jump from it being,
always and everywhere, unacceptable to directly target civilians to wars having acceptable
174
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civilian deaths.

This is because if there were no acceptable civilian deaths, the collective

right of self-defense (which was discussed earlier) would be meaningless. Since the only
way to defend a nation, at times, is to go to war and all modern wars involve civilian deaths,
it must be the case that some civilian deaths are morally acceptable.
In outlining the five categories of people in these conflicts, I have also laid out the
rights that they enjoy. Again, I wish to make the claim that all humans enjoy a right to life
and that in their natural state (non-combative) all humans enjoy it equally. What happens in
war, however, is that combatants, be they soldiers, mercenaries, or insurgents, limit their own
right to life. 175 One piece of evidence for this claim is the oath U.S. servicemen take upon
enlisting:
I, (NAME), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the
United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me,
according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. So help me God. 176
By enlisting in the U.S. military, servicemen take this oath, swearing to follow all
constitutional orders of their superiors.

As a member of the U.S. military, servicemen

sacrifice, in part, their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of movement. Of course,
this is not the only way someone may knowingly sacrifice a right. For example, if you are
arrested in the United States, you are allowed to waive your right to remain silent.
Additionally, as Lackey points out in “The Truth About Pacifism,” “…it is always
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permissible to waive one’s right to self-defence.” 177 Furthermore, even combatants who do
not take an oath limit their right to life, since participating in hostile actions a combatant, as
Walzer explains, “alienates himself from me…and from our common humanity.” 178 I do not
mean to claim, though, that combatants sacrifice all their rights, nor that they sacrifice their
right to life in its entirety, as Walzer seems to claim. 179 The reason this is important is that
since combatants sacrifice some of their right to life, they are charged with sacrificing some
of their own safety if it means that it will provide more safety for those who have not made
such right sacrifices.

All of this leaves one to ask what the implications are of the

combatant’s forfeiture of rights.

As the most highly protected class, innocent civilians

should be considered first.
As mentioned earlier, direct targeting of innocent civilians is unjust. Moreover, it is not
until certain criteria are met that double effect can excuse a combatant from causing the
deaths of innocent civilians, who are not directly targeted. Between the requirements of jus
in bello as well as the consideration of rights, I believe that there are some general
requirements that may be extracted in order to formulate criteria for when double effect may
be applied. First, like a direct attack on civilians, an attack on a structure where civilian
death is clearly foreseeable is also unjust (otherwise double effect could be used to justify all
sorts of terrorist attacks). Second, an attack on enemy combatants in which civilians are also
killed (and it was reasonably foreseeable that they would be) is morally acceptable if and
only if the following criteria are met:
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1. The attack is taking place as part of a war that meets all of
the jus ad bellum criteria.
2. It is not the intention of the attacker that the civilians would
be harmed.
3. The attack is a military necessity as required by jus in bello.
4. The attacker cannot take on more reasonable risk in order to
limit the risk to innocent civilians.
5. The proportion (in numbers) of enemy combatants to
innocent civilians killed must be large.
These criteria warrant some explanation.

The purpose of the first criterion should be

obvious. If any attack is carried out as part of a war that is already unjust, there is no way
that deaths of innocent civilians, much less any deaths, can be justified on account of just
war criteria. 180
For the second criterion, it is necessary that the innocent civilian deaths not be
intended or double effect is not operational.

Additionally, the requirement of the third

criterion should be clear from the earlier discussion of the doctrine of necessity. When it
comes to the fourth criterion, though, the explanation is not quite so simple.
As was mentioned earlier, all humans enjoy the same rights to life, but combatants
waive those rights to a large degree. This means that civilian lives (even of the opposing
group) must be given greater regard than those of the combatants (even of one’s own forces).
So if a military leader is tasked with choosing between an airstrike that will not cause any
military deaths for his own force but ten civilian deaths, whereas a ground assault will have
similar success but with ten military deaths and no civilian deaths, it is required that he
choose the ground assault. It is not the case, however, that the military leader must have his
180
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soldiers take unlimited risks. For example, imagine that in the same scenario, the ground
assault would be successful, but the military leader would lose 1,000 of his combatants. In a
case like this, it would be acceptable to choose the airstrike. Of course, the choices the
military leader must make are clear in extreme cases like this, but when closer numbers of
combatant (of the attacking force) and civilian deaths are likely to result, it is more difficult
to point out which courses of action are just. What must be said, then, is that in choosing
between one method of attack and another, significantly more weight must be given to the
lives of innocent civilians, who have not sacrificed any of their rights, than lives of the
combatants who have. A good rule of thumb may be, as Walzer claims, that “The limits of
risk are fixed…roughly at the point where any further risk-taking would almost certainly
doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not be repeated.” 181
Finally, the fifth criterion that must be met in order to carry out an attack in which
deaths of innocent civilians are clearly foreseeable relates to the proportion of deaths of
enemy combatants to civilians killed. In other words, if a military force is to carry out an
attack on enemy combatants, it ought to be the case that there are more combatant deaths
than civilian. The implication of this criterion is that the attacking force is not allowed to
carry out indiscriminate attacks, for example, on crowded marketplaces, weddings, etc…
where a small number of enemy combatants may be surrounded by large numbers of innocent
civilians.

This, of course, does not rule out more accurate approaches, like raids.

Additionally, there is one problem with this criterion that must be addressed.
When discussing the fifth criterion (for when it is acceptable to apply double effect to
attacks with clearly foreseeable civilian casualties) it must be recognized that there is an
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issue with its application: If no particular ratio of acceptable enemy combatant to civilian
deaths is prescribed, this rule will probably have very different implications in attacks carried
out under different leaders. One way around this issue is to set a particular acceptable ratio
but then we will run into what is called a sorites paradox. 182 In other words, if we set an
acceptable ratio of 100 enemy combatant deaths for every five civilian deaths, we run into
the issue that six civilian deaths would be unacceptable. Yet, claiming that five civilian
deaths are acceptable but six civilian deaths are not is treating nearly identical situations in
wildly different manners. However, compared to the alternative strategy (of not setting an
exact ratio and leaving commanders on the ground to make moral judgments of this sort in
the heat of battle), it is likely to have far worse consequences than setting an arbitrary ratio.
For that reason, a policy attempting to follow just war criteria should include an acceptable
combatant to civilian death ratio for attacks involving foreseeable civilian deaths. 183
A closely related question to the one just discussed is how to apply double effect for
innocent civilian deaths in circumstances where civilian deaths seem unlikely.

In such

instances, the restrictions will be almost identical to the restrictions on instances with clearly
foreseeable deaths, except for criteria four and five. Again, restrictions four and five are:
182
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4. The attacker cannot take on more reasonable risk in order to
limit the risk to innocent civilians.
5. The proportion (in numbers) of enemy combatants to
innocent civilians killed must be large.
In an instance where it seemed unlikely that civilians would be killed, it still is reasonable to
hold combatants to criteria one, two, and three of the double effect criteria for instances in
which civilian death seems likely. What criterion four is calling for is due care, as was
pointed out earlier by Walzer. Yet in the circumstances we are now talking about, the
combatant is unaware of the threat he will pose to civilians. What criterion four should be,
then, is that the combatant must take reasonable steps to investigate whether it is likely that
civilians will be killed (in cases where the combatant is relying on intelligence provided by a
third party it is the moral responsibility of the third party to provide such information). If at
that point it turns out that it is likely that civilians will be killed, the combatant’s
responsibilities revert to the five criteria for double effect in such circumstances.

If,

however, the combatant takes reasonable steps to investigate whether it is likely that civilians
will be killed and it still seems unlikely, step five should no longer apply. In other words, if
steps one through four are properly followed and civilian death still seems unlikely, any
civilian deaths that occur under such circumstances are not the moral responsibility of the
combatant. This is double effect acting at full capacity. Again, what we are talking about
here is a case of an actual accident in which soldiers were both doing their duty and trying to
act morally (as in the scenario of the fighter jet that crashed into an office building earlier in
this section). It seems, then, that even in cases where there are civilian deaths and no enemy
combatant deaths that a set of criteria for these deaths to be morally acceptable may be
formatted as follows:
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1. The attack is taking place as part of a war that meets all of the
jus ad bellum criteria.
2. It is not the intention of the attacker that civilians would be
harmed.
3. The attack is a military necessity as required by jus in bello.
4. The attacker (or those responsible for providing the attacker
with intelligence) made a legitimate effort to verify that civilian
deaths were unlikely.
Just to clarify, then, we can imagine a scenario likely to have occurred in Iraq or
Afghanistan. In both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, a major threat to
American soldiers has been the use of VBIEDS (vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices). Because of the large amount of explosives that can be held in a vehicle, a very
effective way to overcome the protective abilities of armored coalition vehicles is to drive a
VBIED up to a coalition vehicle and detonate it. Even if the armor is not pierced by the
detonation, it is still possible to kill combatants inside because the impact may be worse than
that in a car accident. As a way of countering this tactic, coalition forces have required that
when they are driving through certain areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, all vehicles pull off to
the side of the road. In order to protect civilians, the directive in these areas has also been
that if a vehicle is not complying (they are driving towards a coalition convoy), the coalition
forces must first waive an orange flag and use hand signals to try to get the approaching
vehicle to pull off the road. If the vehicle continues towards the coalition convoy, they must
then shoot a flare, followed by warning shots fired into a safe direction, followed by shooting
at the approaching vehicle’s tires, followed by shooting at the approaching vehicle’s engine
block, and finally, if there is no other way to prevent the vehicle from approaching the
convoy the soldiers can fire on its occupants. All of these precautions are taken to avoid an
instance where a civilian driver, who is unaware of the rules or is oblivious to what is going
84

on around him or her, becomes the target of a defensive attack. Unfortunately, all of these
steps put the coalition forces at further risk but, as has obviously been recognized by the area
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, combatants have a responsibility to take due care in
avoiding civilian death. Were civilians to be killed while driving what seemed to be a
VBIED up to a coalition convoy in Afghanistan, and had the coalition forces followed the
four criteria for such circumstances, the death would be unfortunate but not the moral
responsibility of the combatants.
Besides innocent civilians there are still four other groups of people to be discussed.
These groups, however, have slightly easier statuses to deal with. First, combatants must
have the least number of restrictions on attacking, since they, as pointed out by Walzer,
largely sacrifice their right to life.

Assuming that the means used in an attack against

combatants are not mala in se, all of the previously discussed rules require only that the
attack be part of a war, which satisfies all of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria. In an
article for the Ford Institute for Human Security, Jeff McMahan explains, “it is not the
posing of a threat but only the posing of an unjust threat that can make a person liable to
defensive violence.” 184 This means “that in general the only combatants who are morally
justified in fighting are those who fight for a just cause in a just war.” 185 Additionally, it
must be recognized, though, that they do “gain war rights as combatants and potential
prisoners…” 186 Codified in the Geneva Conventions, these rights include, among other
things, protections as prisoners of war, “particularly against acts of violence or intimidation
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and against insults and public curiosity.” 187 Additionally, prisoners of war must be treated
for illnesses and released at the end of hostilities. 188 The only exceptions to these rules are
when those captured have violated the principles of international charters or jus in bello (this
will be discussed further toward the end of this section) When it comes to complacent
civilians, however, the restrictions more closely resemble those of innocent civilians than
those of combatants.
Of complacent civilians, there are those who are passively complacent and those who
are actively complacent. The difference is that passively complacent civilians gain their
status (rather than remaining innocent civilians) through an omission, such as knowing where
insurgents are hiding but doing nothing to notify the opposing force. On the other hand,
actively complacent civilians take actual steps or actions to aid the insurgents, whether they
be feeding them, providing them with shelter, or even allowing them to use their land for
storage of weapons.

What seems to be happening in each of these cases is that the

complacent civilians take a step away from innocence by adding to the threat of harm posed
by a combatant force. That being the case, the difference between complacent and innocent
civilians is that the former group has slightly less of a claim to life. One can picture, then, to
some extent, a spectrum on which people lie from the greatest to the least right to life:
innocent civilians, passively complacent civilians, actively complacent civilians, combatants
(with there being a large distance between the actively complacent civilian and the
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combatants since the combatant takes a much larger step towards posing harm).

The

practical difference between innocent and complacent civilians is only the effect on the ratio
of acceptable combatant to civilian deaths in attacks with foreseeable civilian casualties. For
example, if the ratio for combatant to innocent civilians was set at 100:5, as discussed earlier,
we might want to set the ratio at 100:8 for the passively complacent civilians and 100:20 for
the actively complacent civilians. Of course, these are once again arbitrary ratios, but they
reflect the fact that these complacent civilians have taken some steps, be they acts or
omissions, to add to the danger posed to soldiers, and so have forfeited some of their right to
life.
The final group that must be considered is the child soldier. Just as with other groups
of people, child soldiers enjoy some right to life but they pose a peculiar problem in their
seeming lack of moral responsibility for some actions. In “An Ethical Perspective on Child
Soldiers,” Jeff McMahan points out that in dealing with the issue of child soldiers, we must
ask whether there is a “moral requirement to exercise restraint in fighting them…” and
whether just combatants ought to “accept greater risks to themselves in order to minimize the
harm they inflict on child soldiers?” 189
In the war on terror, it has fortunately been the case that the use of child soldiers has
been rare. There have, however, been isolated incidents. For example, in September of 2007
insurgents in Iraq’s Anbar Province outfitted a fourteen-year-old boy with an explosive-laden
suicide vest. The boy, who was likely following the instructions of an adult, walked into an
outdoor common area where several families had gathered to eat dinner (a common practice
during Ramadan). The boy began handing candy out to the children at the dinner and once
189
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they had all gathered around him detonated the device, killing nearly everyone there,
including himself. Imagine that this same scenario was about to take place in Afghanistan,
but a coalition soldier could stop it but only by killing the boy. Certainly in this instance the
soldier should stop the attack, even if it means killing a fourteen-year-old boy. In this
instance this may justified on the grounds that the boy is old enough that he is at least
minimally responsible for the attack, and so he loses the large right to life enjoyed by
civilians.
Imagine a similar scenario but now the child is six and he is unaware that what he is
wearing is a bomb that will detonate at a predetermined time. It is much tougher in this
instance to say that the boy is even minimally responsible for the threat he is posing.

He

seems to be, what McMahan refers to as a “nonresponsible threat.” In other words, the child
is causally involved in the threat but is not morally responsible for it. 190 Additionally,
imagine that instead of it being innocent families who are being threatened, it is one soldier
who must either kill the child or be killed himself. It seems that in this particular situation
the soldier may kill the child because the child will die in the explosion and so their right to
life will be violated either way. We can, though, imagine that the child will somehow
survive the explosion but the soldier will die. Now, in either case only one person will die,
the soldier or child. Again, the child is a nonresponsible threat. In this scenario it seems,
then, that if we say the soldier can kill the child, he would also be able to do so with an
innocent civilian who was somehow posing a nonresponsible threat (we can imagine a
scenario in which an innocent civilian is driving a car, unaware that it has a bomb in it that
will be detonated by a timer). Yet, as was pointed out earlier, it is unacceptable to directly
190
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target an individual who you believe to a civilian. What we must conclude, then, is that in a
case where the child is a truly non-responsible threat, the only basis on which the soldier can
choose his or her own life is personal preference.

Furthermore, just as with innocent

civilians, child soldiers in this case do not do anything, if they are non-responsible, to
sacrifice their right to life, and so must their life must be taken to outweigh the adult
soldier’s life. Indeed, the soldier must choose the life of the child over his own. Of course,
this seems to go against common intuition. We tend to feel that people have a right to selfdefense but that right seems to come from the diminished rights of the attacker because of
their moral responsibility for the attack. Fortunately, this common intuition does not have to
be overridden in practice because it seems that there really are not any non-responsible
threats of this sort.
As explained by McMahan, “the idea that even terribly abused children can be
morally responsible for their action is not implausible.” 191 We commonly hold children to be
morally responsible for their actions from a very early age. For example, McMahan points
out that “If one’s own child or the neighbor’s child torments the cat, one regards it very
differently from the way one regards the dog’s efforts to harm the cat.” 192 When a pitbull
attacks a passerby we tend to place all of the moral blame on the owner, since the dog is
incapable of taking on moral responsibility. In the case of humans, though, it seems that
even children (who have developed basic mental capacities) have more responsibility for
their actions than animals, and so must be at least minimally responsible for their actions. It
being that case that children are at least minimally responsible for their actions, the
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restrictions on soldiers in dealing with child combatants should be very similar to the
restrictions for dealing with adult combatants: attacks that follow jus ad bellum and jus in
bello requirements are morally acceptable.
Because the basic guidelines for attacks on child and adult combatants are the same,
though, does not imply that the attacks can be carried out in the same way. Taking the
proportionality requirement into consideration, we should recognize that the means
acceptable for neutralizing the threats from those who are fully morally responsible are not
all acceptable for use against those who are not. For example, there is nothing wrong with
using an air-to-surface missile to kill a group of adult combatants who are currently posing
no harm, but the same cannot be said of a similar attack on a group of child soldiers. In
dealing with child soldiers, then, the requirement must be that the least amount of force
possible is used, but that soldiers are not required to sacrifice their lives in order to avoid
taking those of minimally responsible child soldiers. The key here is the level of restraint
that ought to be shown, which is unnecessary in combat against fully morally responsible
adult soldiers. Once again referring to McMahan, “Just combatants should show them [child
soldiers] mercy, even at the cost of additional risk to themselves, to try to allow these already
greatly wronged children a chance at life.” 193 As a side note, it is worth mentioning that
when child soldiers are killed in justified attacks, their deaths are at least partially the moral
responsibility of the adults who turned them into combatants. What this means is that even if
these adults do not participate in combat directly, they can be considered combatants
themselves and so are liable to attack.
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With all of the categories of people worked out, all that is left to do is analyze
Operation Enduring Freedom according to these requirements. There are two aspects of the
war that we can analyze in regards to these requirements: whether particular attacks have
been violating these rules and whether particular styles of attack in the war are mala in se.

Jus In Bello in Afghanistan
In evaluating the impact of the War in Afghanistan on noncombatants, it is difficult to
come up with reliable figures for civilian deaths and whom those deaths can be attributed to.
One reason for this is obviously that the U.S. coalition has a vested interest in civilian
casualty statistics being low, and the opposite is true for the insurgents. Another reason for
problems with the collection and analysis of civilian death rates is that the war is still going
on, making it especially dangerous for human rights groups to collect such information.
Still, some groups have tried to do this work and there are a few points that can be extracted
from their research and put towards a moral evaluation.
Statistics on noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan seem to have become more widely
available in the most recent years of the war. According to Human Rights Watch “In 2006,
at least 929 Afghan civilians were killed in fighting related to the armed conflict.” 194 Of
those deaths they attributed 230 to the U.S. coalition, 116 of which were attributed to
airstrikes. In the following year, 2007, Human Rights Watch tallied 1,633 noncombatant
deaths, with 321 being caused by U.S. Coalition airstrikes. 195 These totals are similar to
those put forward by the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, which put civilian deaths
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from 2006 to 2008 at 929, 1523, and 2118, respectively. 196 According to a meta-analysis by
the Human Security Report Project, in 2009 there were 2,412 noncombatant deaths, with 596
caused by pro-government forces (which include Afghani forces). 197

Most recently the

Afghanistan Rights Monitor, put the 2010 civilian death toll in Afghanistan at “at least
2,421” with 512 being attributable to U.S./NATO forces. 198
There are several points that can be made about these statistics. First, insurgents have
caused the majority of noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan (most of which have been
attributed to IEDs). Additionally, it is hard to tell what the causes of each civilian death
attributable to U.S./NATO forces were but it is likely that as with 2006, the majority were
caused by airstrikes. What this data will not tell us though, is how many of these strikes took
place after the precautions necessary for double effect to apply were followed. There are
some factors, however, which seem show that at least some of the civilian deaths in these
cases were not justified according to jus in bello requirements.
One issue with the tactics used in Afghanistan is the reliance on indiscriminate
weapons that pose an unnecessary risk to civilians. In a New York Times Article published
in 2001, Eric Schmitt and James Dao boasted about the precision of U.S. weapons.
According to Schmitt and Dao, “New guidance systems have been strapped onto older
weapons, like the cluster bombs dropped near Kunduz, making them devastatingly
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accurate.” 199 Unfortunately, as pointed out by the Project on Defense Alternatives’ Carl
Conetta, with the increased useage of “smart” weapons in Afghanistan (as compared to
Kosovo), there was also a switch from laser-guided to GPS-guided weapons. According to
Conetta, “Most current GPS directed weapons, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM), are simply less accurate than laser-guided bombs.” 200 The difference, between the
accuracy of laser and GPS guided weapons does seem to only be several meters, but when
targeting houses, as is often done in Afghanistan, this can certainly be the difference between
a successful attack and a slaughter of innocent civilians.
In addition to the use of GPS guided munitions, the U.S. has, at least at times, used
cluster bombs. According to the Afghanistan Rights Monitor,
Cluster munitions are large weapons which are deployed from
the air and ground and release dozens or hundreds of smaller
submunitions also called “bomblets,” or “grenades” which pose
two main risks to civilians. First, their widespread dispersal
means they cannot distinguish between military targets and
civilians so the humanitarian impact can be extreme, especially
when the weapon is used in or near populated areas.
Additionally, cluster submunitions often fail to detonate. These “dud” submunitions can be
very unstable and so are very dangerous to people in the area that may step on them (which is
relatively easy since submunitions are often between the size of a baseball and a football.)
When it comes to cluster bombs, it seems that their use should be stopped completely.
The danger they pose to civilians is a direct violation of the due care called for in the criteria
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for the use of double effect. Additionally, the use of other weapons should be restricted to
the most accurate and least damaging weapons that can carry out the missions.

Often

weapons like the JDAM are used when they do not have to be. For example, while I was
deployed to Iraq, the military would often use JDAMs to destroy houses that were likely
rigged with explosives. As explosive ordnance disposal technicians, my team and I were
qualified to go into these houses and disarm any explosive devices by hand. Of course,
doing so would have put my team and I at risk, but that is a necessary risk if due care is to be
taken.
Another example of JDAMs being used when alternative means were available was in
Baquba Iraq, in spring of 2008. Several industrial chlorine tanks had been left in a field and
instead of disposing of them properly the military decided to drop JDAMs on them. In this
case it was American troops and not civilians who were harmed because the tanks were not
destroyed but only damaged and the chlorine gas from the tanks was carried downwind,
leaving several soldiers in need of immediate medical treatment. Certainly, had the wind
been blowing in a different direction (it seems that in this case there was no attention paid to
the wind direction), a nearby town full of civilians could have been exposed to chlorine gas.
It is this type of carelessness and lack of precaution in combat that leads to immoral civilian
death. When alternative means are available which can carry out the mission and have less
potential for civilian death they must be used if the civilian right to life is to be protected.
Besides these specific types of weapons and their overuse there is another issue regarding
when and how often airstrikes are used.
The war in Afghanistan has been different than many previous wars in the small
number of troops dedicated to carrying out its operations. Instead of using large units to go
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after insurgents, the idea was to use technology and special operations forces. The result has
been that airstrikes have often been unplanned. As was discussed earlier in this section, to
carry out an attack there is a level of care that must be taken in order to satisfy the duty not to
interfere with the civilian right to life. However, in instances where airstrikes are unplanned
(for example, the lightly armed special forces teams often call in air support when they come
under fire), the care that can be taken with planning is no longer possible. In a report by
Human Rights Watch called “‘Troops In Contact’ Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan,” they explain that
Whether civilian casualties result from aerial bombing in
Afghanistan seems to depend more than anything else on
whether the airstrike was planned or was an unplanned strike in
rapid response to an evolving military situation on the ground.
When aerial bombing is planned, mostly against suspected
Taliban targets, US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have had a
very good record of minimizing harm to civilians. In 2008, no
planned airstrikes appear to have resulted in civilian casualties.
In 2007, it appears that only one planned airstrike resulted in
civilian casualties. In 2006, at least one attack resulting in
civilian deaths may have been a planned attack. 201
The war in Afghanistan has been fought, or at least had been for the past few years with an
astoundingly low number of troops for the size of the country and population. The following
chart shows the number of American troops deployed to Afghanistan throughout the course
of the war: 202
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As can be seen in this chart from the Brookings Institute, for the first six years of the war in
Afghanistan, the United States dedicated less that 25,000 troops. Similarly, the 48 other
countries that have dedicated troops to the U.S./NATO coalition deployed a total of 10,500
or less troops through June of 2006. 203 Meanwhile, the midyear population of Afghanistan in
2002 was 23,051,000. 204 If we focus, for example, on November of 2002, there were 9,500
U.S. troops and 9,400 Non-U.S. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, meaning that for every
troop deployed to Afghanistan there were 1,219 Afghans.

Besides the fact that large

numbers of those troops were not combat troops (every military unit depends on a support
structure made up of other troops, for example, administrative and logistical support troops),
the sheer size of the Afghan population meant that providing a reasonable level of safety for
the civilian portion of the population would be almost impossible. Of course, I am not
claiming that the force deployed to a foreign country in a war has to be large enough to
203
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provide absolute protection to the civilian population against harm from the enemy. What I
am claiming, though, is that the force must be large enough so that unplanned airstrikes do
not serve as the primary response to attacks on friendly forces. In other words, if a war is to
be fought morally, it will require a large enough force. The war in Afghanistan has not, until
more recently, received a force even relatively near adequate to carry out this task and so the
War in Afghanistan has largely been fought immorally. Before completely condemning
actions in the war, though, I would like to point out a few of the American effort’s saving
graces.
First, it seems that what civilian deaths Americans have caused in Afghanistan have
mostly been unintentional. What has been missing in Afghanistan, as compared to other
wars, are intentional massacres of civilians. Vietnam, for example, was full of terrible
instances, such as the My Lai Massacre in which American troops intentionally slaughtered
somewhere over 300 civilians. 205 Likewise, the heavy aerial bombardment that intentionally
killed civilians in World War II has not been present either. Secondly, the U.S. has more
recently been taking steps to make it clear that airstrikes should not be used except in
instances where they absolutely must be. In a new Tactical Directive released in 2010,
General Patraeus wrote that
Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the strike
must determine that no civilians are present. If unable to assess
the risk of civilian presence, fires are prohibited, except under
one of the following two conditions… 206
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Unfortunately, these conditions are classified and so we cannot evaluate whether they are
sufficient to warrant not taking further steps to ensure civilian safety before attacking.
Furthermore, these directives have come out much too far into the war to have prevented a
lot of civilian death that could have been avoided. Finally, the amount of troops needed to
fight the war in a more just manner is now being dedicated. Nearly ten years into the war
there are more than 140,000 Coalition troops in Afghanistan 207 and the administration is
finally beginning to take responsibility in situations where civilians are killed because of a
lack of due care. 208 It is safe to say then, that while the war in Afghanistan has not been
fought in a completely just manner it has been fought in a more just, or less unjust manner
than many previous wars and is improving, despite the war being carried on for nearly 10
years. Unfortunately, there is one more major problem with the war in Afghanistan, but this
has to do not with how it is being fought but with what is being done with enemy combatants
once they are captured

Hybridization
In Section II of this paper the distinctions between the crime and war paradigms were
outlined. It was clear then, that the war paradigm requires that once an enemy combatant is
captured, whether that be as a result of injury or surrender, they take on the status of a
prisoner of war. Earlier in this section, it was explained that although combatants largely
sacrifice their right to life, they do enjoy a new set of rights in exchange. Amongst these
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rights, some of which are laid out in the Geneva Conventions, are the rights to medical care,
humane treatment, and repatriation at the end of hostilities. 209

As a matter of both

international norms and morality, once an enemy combatant is captured they can no longer
be treated as a combatant.

They are neither subject to punishment (unless they have

committed war crimes) nor torture. If it is the case that a combatant has committed war
crimes, they are to be allowed a fair trial. The reason for this is that while following the war
paradigm, soldiers are allowed (and expected) to kill enemy combatants and in turn enemy
combatants can (according to international norms) fight back, assuming they are using
legitimate means of fighting. That being the case, we cannot, after trying to kill enemy
combatants, capture them and treat them as though their fighting back was a crime. In other
words, as pointed out by George Washington University Professor David Luban, “It is
impermissible to punish him [a combatant] for his role in fighting the war. Nor can he be
harshly interrogated after he is captured.” 210 Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, the U.S. has
largely disregarded these norms and uniformly treated enemy combatants who are captured
as criminals, no matter what their actions were in the war.
In an essay by Vincent-Joel Proulx, a law clerk at the International Court of Justice in
the Hague, “In mounting Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States was adamant in
expounding that Taliban members would be stripped of prisoner of war (‘POW’) status,
while it also claimed that members of the Al Qaeda network would not benefit from the
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protection of the Geneva Conventions.” 211

In an announcement by Press Secretary Ari

Fleischer on February 7, 2002 he explained that
…President Bush today has decided that the Geneva Convention
will apply to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda
international terrorists…. Under Article 4 of the Geneva
Convention, however, Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW
status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees would have to have satisfied four conditions:
They would have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would
have to have worn uniforms or other distinctive signs visible at
a distance; they would have to have carried arms openly; and
they would have to have conducted their military operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. 212
In other words, the Bush administration had made it a crime, to fight against the U.S. in
Operation Enduring Freedom, combining both the war and crime paradigms.

This new

hybrid model stripped all human rights from the enemy forces by allowing that we try to kill
them according to the war model (in which combatants largely lose their right to life) and
then indefinitely detain them (as criminals without any prisoner of war rights) and torture
them, in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions. 213
The implications of the Bush administration’s decision to uniformly deny the Taliban
and Al Qaeda forces prisoner of war statuses were significant. The decision denied the
opposing forces of any of the rights allowed by the war or crime paradigms, while
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simultaneously allowing the administration the benefits of both paradigms: Not only could
we now kill the opposing forces, but we could also treat them as criminals if they were
captured. Yet, the basis for doing so, especially in the case of the Taliban, was extremely
flimsy.
As pointed out by Press Secretary Fleischer, according to the Geneva Conventions
there are several requirements that must be followed for combatants to be protected, amongst
which are the requirements to be distinguishable from civilians and to fight according to the
laws of war. When it comes to being distinguishable from civilians, it is not completely
clear that all of the Taliban forces violated this rule. First of all, it may have been the case,
at least in some instances, that some of the Taliban were distinguishable by their black
turbans, carrying of weapons, or possibly by their uniform maintenance of beards.
Additionally, although this does not justify any lack of distinction on the part of the Taliban,
U.S. forces have a habit of using civilian attire and sterile uniforms in combat themselves,
but expect that they are protected by the Geneva Conventions. The point, here, is not that the
administration was wrong in denying Taliban members protection under the Geneva
Convention due to their lack of distinction in all cases (or even any case), but that a uniform
designation of this sort is not justified. It may be that some of the Taliban fought within the
criteria of the Geneva conventions and so should have been afforded its protections. In an
article for the American Journal of International Law, George H. Aldrich explained how the
administration should have dealt with the issue of the enemy forces not distinguishing
themselves from civilians:
I would suggest that a necessary first step would be for the
United States to make public both the basis and the reason for
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denying POW status to all Taliban prisoners, not simply by
asserting that the Taliban armed forces neither distinguished
themselves adequately from the civilian population nor
conducted their military operations in accordance with the laws
of war, but by documenting such assertions and accompanying
this evidence with a convincing explanation of the gravity of
these matters and some elaboration of the evidently felt need to
deprive them of POW status. 214
The real issue here is that the administration has attempted to treat all enemy combatants as
war criminals. Yet, not distinguishing oneself is not sufficient for being labeled as such. To
be a war criminal, and sacrifice prisoner of war status rights, one must actually commit a war
crime. 215 In this case a combatant must not only not distinguish himself but must carry out
an attack simultaneously. If that were not the case then it would be a near impossibility for
any combatant, on either side, to keep prisoner of war status if captured. In other words, to
claim that a combatant loses prisoner of war status as soon as they fail to distinguish
themselves would prevent combatants from ever removing their uniform in a combat zone
(for example, while returning to base, since there are almost always civilians present on a
base). Furthermore, although it may be possible that no enemy combatant distinguished
himself from civilians in OEF, there should be an investigation done into each case to see
whether they had simultaneously performed hostile actions. If a combatant has not, then they
have done nothing to sacrifice their rights as a captured combatant. In order to protect the
rights of combatants, it should certainly be the case that everyone captured is given prisoner
of war status if there is doubt about whether they qualify. 216 Only after an investigation
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should a combatant’s war rights be revoked, and that is after it has been shown that they are a
war criminal.
It is not the denial of prisoner of war status to those captured in Afghanistan, though,
that has been the worst moral issue with hybridization. Far worse has been the fact that
prisoners have been tortured at the hands of Americans. Once captured, the enemy forces
should be detained until hostilities have ended and then repatriated. In the meantime they
should be held in conditions that respect their rights as human beings. This does not mean,
however, that there are not many detainees that should be punished. When it is found that
there is sufficient evidence to try a detainee before a military commission for violation of the
rules of war that is what should be done. Maintaining this restriction on punishing only those
who have violated the rules of war means maintaining the distinction of the crime and war
paradigms and respects the basic rights that must be accounted for if American actions are to
be just.
Finally, there have been some who have objected to the detention of combatants who
are captured until the end of hostilities on the grounds that the war on terror can have no
identifiable end. As Luban points out, “In the War on Terrorism, no capitulation is possible.
That means that the real aim of the war is, quite simply, to kill or capture all of the
terrorists—to keep on killing and killing, capturing and capturing, until they are all gone.” 217
What can be said in response to this claim is that the war in Afghanistan must specifically be
looked at as that, a war within a specific country, against specific forces: the Taliban and Al
Qaida in Afghanistan. What relationship there is between the other aspects of the War on
Terrorism (Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in Iraq, etc…) must be looked at as
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related but not one and the same conflict. Those who are captured within Afghanistan can,
within the moral restrictions of the war paradigm, be held until the cessations of hostilities
within Afghanistan.

Conclusion
After reviewing the U.S. response to 9/11 through what has largely been a war
paradigm with some elements of the crime paradigm intermingled, there are many lessons to
be learned. As was pointed out, in Section III, the President is largely free to respond to acts
of terrorism through a war paradigm. Additionally, one form of guidance in instances where
a war paradigm is chosen should be ethical considerations.
As was discovered in this section, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an unjust war for its
violations of the principles of jus ad bellum. In contrast, Operation Enduring Freedom has
been a just war according to jus ad bellum, but has violated some of the requirements of jus
in bello. However, in comparison to most other wars, OEF has been less unjust, and the
efforts of the U.S./NATO have done far less to violate human rights than the actions of the
Taliban and Al Qaeda.
If the U.S. was to respond to a future terrorist attack through the war paradigm I
would make several suggestions in order for the war to come closer to the ideal of a just war.
First, the U.S. should dedicate a large number of troops and should also try to have as much
international cooperation as possible to provide security for the civilian population and avoid
an immoral overreliance on unplanned airstrikes. A side note to this point is that dedicating
a large enough force may very possibly help to avoid unnecessarily long conflicts. As was
pointed out in a study by the RAND organization, a minimum soldier to population ratio of
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twenty soldiers for every thousand citizens is required for successful stability operations. 218
With a similar line of thought, Colin Powell has formulated what has come to be known as
the Powell Docrtine: “military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is
a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be
overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong
support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from
the conflict in which the military is engaged.” 219

Whether following the RAND

recommendation or the Powell Doctrine would lead to a military victory is beyond the scope
of this paper. What can be said, though, is that sticking to such standards would make it
more likely that a war can and would be fought justly.
The U.S. response to 9/11 in OIF and OEF has been constitutionally sound but not
completely ethical according to a just war analysis.

The major downfall of Operation

Enduring Freedom has been the back end inclusion of the punishment elements of the crime
paradigm. In future conflicts, in order for a war to be conducted justly it must strictly stay
within the confines of the war paradigm. That said, although the U.S. response to 9/11
through Operation Enduring Freedom has not been completely just, it has been better than
most wars, and through stricter adherence to the principles of Just War Theory, it may be
possible for future counter-terror wars to be just.
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